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A “DISACKNOWLEDGMENT” OF POST-SECONDARY STUDENT 
FREE SPEECH—BROWN v. LI AND THE APPLICABILITY OF 
HAZELWOOD v. KUHLMEIER TO THE POST-SECONDARY 
SETTING 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
  By voluntarily entering the university, or being placed there by those 
having the right to control him, [the student] necessarily surrenders very many 
of his individual rights.  How his time shall be occupied; what his habits shall 
be; his general deportment; . . . his hours of study and recreation,—in all these 
matters, and many others, he must yield obedience to those who, for the time 
being, are his masters . . . .1 
Fortunately for today’s undergraduate and graduate students, such a 
view—at least in theory—no longer prevails.  However, sometimes, the more 
things change, the more they seem to stay the same.  As will be the focus of 
this Note, in the realm of First Amendment free speech rights, applying the 
deferential Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier2 standard to the post-secondary setting 
would likely perpetuate the control of university officials, albeit in a less 
dramatic form. 
The free speech rights of students are frequently pitted against the free 
speech rights of teachers and school administrators.  When such a collision of 
rights occurs, the courts must intervene.  The United States Supreme Court’s 
intervention resulted in a trilogy of cases that has shaped and defined 
jurisprudence in this area at the pre-collegiate level—the Tinker-Fraser-
Hazelwood trilogy.3 
The jurisprudence surrounding this collision of rights in the educational 
setting has been a jurisprudence of distinctions.  Courts have made distinctions 
between the types of speech at issue.  Thus, First Amendment caselaw in the 
educational setting can be categorized into cases dealing with lewd, vulgar, and 
plainly offensive speech, “school-sponsored speech,” and other speech that 
 
 1. Todd Edward Pettys, Note, Punishing Offensive Conduct on University Campuses: Iota 
Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University, 72 N.C. L. REV. 789, 799 
(1994) (quoting North v. Bd. of Trs., 27 N.E. 54, 56 (Ill. 1891)). 
 2. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).  This Note will only address students’ free speech rights in the 
public school setting. 
 3. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 
(1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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“happens to occur on the school premises,” or pure speech.4  In addition, courts 
have made distinctions based on the medium through which, or the place 
where, the speech was communicated.5  Thus, First Amendment caselaw can 
also be categorized depending on whether the speech was made in a traditional 
public forum, in a limited public forum, or in a nonpublic forum.6  One 
distinction, though, that courts consistently have failed to make is the 
distinction between free speech rights at the primary and secondary school 
level as opposed to free speech rights at the undergraduate and graduate school 
level.7 
The source of much of the confusion and disagreement in this complex and 
sensitive area of the law has stemmed from a footnote in the 1988 Hazelwood 
case.8  In Hazelwood, a case dealing with a high school newspaper, the Court 
held that educators’ actions to censor student speech did not violate the First 
Amendment  “so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”9  However, in the now infamous footnote seven, the 
Court specifically limited its holding to the high school level: “We need not 
now decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect 
to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university level.”10  
Almost fifteen years later, the Supreme Court has yet to answer this question, 
and the lower courts have failed to agree on what degree of deference should 
be afforded officials at the college level.11 
The confusion caused by footnote seven is readily apparent in the recent 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case of Brown v. Li.12  Christopher Brown, a 
master’s degree candidate at the University of California at Santa Barbara, 
claimed that his First Amendment rights were violated.13  The committee 
reviewing his thesis initially approved it, but afterwards, Brown added a 
“Disacknowledgments” section, complete with profanity and criticism of 
school officials.14  The committee, upon finding out about the section, refused 
 
 4. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 923 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 81-82. 
 6. See infra Part II.B. 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 136-43 and Part III.B. 
 8. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7. 
 9. Id. at 273. 
 10. Id. at 273 n.7. 
 11. See infra Part II.D.2. 
 12. 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1488 (2003).  For a more in-depth 
discussion of the facts and opinions in Brown, see infra Part III. 
 13. Brown, 308 F.3d at 941-42. 
 14. Id. at 943.  This “Disacknowledgments” section was basically the antithesis of the 
“traditional” Acknowledgment, or dedication, section that some students choose to submit with 
their writings.  For a more in-depth discussion of the content of Brown’s “Disacknowledgments” 
section, see infra Part III.A. 
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to approve the section, even after Brown removed the profanity.15  The Dean of 
the school informed Brown that he would not receive his degree if his thesis 
were not approved, and that his thesis would not be approved unless Brown 
removed the “Disacknowledgements” section.16  These facts resulted in a 
fragmented opinion from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Two judges 
concluded that Brown’s rights were not violated by the school’s refusal to 
allow him to include the “Disacknowledgments” section, but for drastically 
different reasons.17  One of these judges reasoned that Brown’s rights were not 
violated because, as a matter of first impression for the Ninth Circuit, 
Hazelwood applied at the college level, and thus, the school official’s actions 
were justified under the deferential Hazelwood standard.18 
Although Brown creates no binding precedent19 and, at first glance, may 
seem of little importance, the underlying issues at stake and the arguments 
made for extending the deferential Hazelwood standard to the college arena 
have far-reaching implications for free speech rights at the post-secondary 
level.  Applying Hazelwood to the post-secondary setting would ignore well-
settled precedents,20 and could result in the free speech rights of an 
undergraduate or graduate student—who could be in his or her twenties, 
thirties, forties, or even older—receiving the same protection as the free speech 
rights of a kindergartener.21  Moreover, although the Brown court attempted to 
limit its reasoning to curriculum-related speech, the possibility exists that 
Hazelwood could be extended in the post-secondary setting to extracurricular 
speech as well.22  In addition, there is a risk that if a clear distinction is not 
made between the pre-collegiate and collegiate school environments in free 
speech cases, courts may be willing to extend analyses utilized in pre-
 
 15. Brown, 308 F.3d at 943-44. 
 16. Id. at 944. 
 17. Id. at 957 (Reinhardt J., dissenting).  For a more in-depth discussion and analysis of the 
judges’ opinions, see infra Parts III.B and III.C. 
 18. Id. at 951-53. 
 19. See infra note 179. 
 20. See infra Part II.C. 
 21. Of course, under the Hazelwood analysis emotional maturity is taken into account.  See 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988).  However, both 
primary/secondary and post-secondary students’ speech rights still could be violated if the 
school’s actions are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”  Id. at 273.  Even if 
emotional maturity is a factor to consider, the fact of the matter remains that the standard would 
be easier for post-secondary school officials to meet.  See infra note 267 and accompanying text 
(noting that the majority of courts applying Hazelwood have come out in favor of the school 
officials). 
 22. See infra notes 110, 266-67 and accompanying text. 
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collegiate cases to higher education cases in areas besides the First 
Amendment.23 
Although others have examined collegiate level cases that have applied the 
Hazelwood analysis24 and argued that Hazelwood should not extend to the 
post-secondary setting,25 they have not done so in the context of the recent 
Brown case and the unique reasoning employed by the Ninth Circuit.26  
Moreover, this Note will identify other areas of the law beyond free speech 
that have created distinctions between the secondary and post-secondary 
school settings.27 
Part II of this Note consists of a historical analysis of the underlying issues 
at stake in Brown v. Li, focusing on how courts have made distinctions 
between the pre-collegiate and collegiate environments.  Part III gives a 
detailed account of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Brown v. Li.  
Part IV provides an analysis of the various opinions in Brown, as well as an 
analysis of the following proposed standards for courts to apply in the place of 
Hazelwood: (1) a modified Hazelwood standard; (2) a “student-friendly” 
Tinker standard; (3) a limited public forum standard; (4) an intermediate level 
of scrutiny standard, or (5) a standard reminiscent of those presented in Healy 
v. James28 and Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri.29  
Part V concludes that the Supreme Court needs to resolve the unanswered 
Hazelwood issue to clear up the confusion in the lower courts and should do so 
by continuing its tradition of safeguarding free speech in the university setting.  
By doing so, the Court will give due credit to the uniqueness of the post-
 
 23. Gail Sorenson & Andrew S. LaManque, The Application of Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier in 
College Litigation, 22 J.C. & U.L. 971, 974 (1996) (noting that “application to higher education 
cases of rationales developed in pre-collegiate cases may spread beyond First Amendment speech 
issues, however important, to unduly limit collegiate faculty and student freedom in other 
important respects.”). 
 24. See generally id.  This article chronicled the ten cases in higher education that had cited 
Hazelwood at the time the article was written.  Sorenson and LaManque’s article is an excellent 
starting point.  This Note will both incorporate and update the higher education cases citing 
Hazelwood. 
 25. See, e.g., Mark J. Fiore, Comment, Trampling the “Marketplace of Ideas”: The Case 
Against Extending Hazelwood to College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2002).  Fiore 
comments on the issue of whether Hazelwood should extend to the college level, principally in 
the context of the Sixth Circuit decision of Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (en 
banc).  Although this Note comes to the same conclusion as Fiore’s article, it does so for different 
reasons, and also examines the issue in the context of Brown. 
 26. See infra Part III.B. 
 27. See infra Part II.E. 
 28. 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
 29. 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam). 
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secondary setting and will ensure the continued viability of the “marketplace of 
ideas.”30 
II.  HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
A. Landmark Trilogy: First Amendment Rights in the Public School Setting 
The landmark cases discussed below have formed the foundation of 
American jurisprudence concerning the collision of First Amendment rights in 
the school setting.  Although all three cases concern pre-collegiate free speech 
rights, many lower courts use them to define the scope of First Amendment 
rights in the college and university settings.31 
As the Supreme Court once noted: 
“The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than 
in the community of American schools.”  The classroom is peculiarly the 
“marketplace of ideas.”  The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained 
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 
“out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative 
selection.”32 
This fundamental principle was reaffirmed in the first case of the Supreme 
Court trilogy, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.33  
In Tinker, three students, ages thirteen, fifteen, and sixteen years old, wanted to 
protest the Vietnam War and advocate peace by wearing black armbands to 
 
 30. The notion of the “marketplace of ideas” was first expressed by Justice Holmes in his 
dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Holmes wrote: 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to 
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that 
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.  That at any 
rate is the theory of our Constitution.  It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.  
Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based 
upon imperfect knowledge.  While that experiment is part of our system I think that we 
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we 
loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate 
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is 
required to save the country. 
Id. at 630 (emphasis added). 
 31. See infra notes 139-143 and accompanying text; see also infra Parts III.B.1, 3. 
 32. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citations omitted). 
 33. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).  For a more in-depth 
analysis of Tinker, see, for example, Andrew D.M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and 
Student Expression, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 628-30, 650-54 (2002). 
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school.34  Upon hearing about the students’ intentions, school officials 
immediately adopted a policy that led to the disciplining of any student who 
wore such an armband to school.35  Despite the policy, the students chose to 
wear the armbands and they were disciplined accordingly.  They claimed that 
school officials representing the high school and junior high school violated 
their First Amendment right to free speech.36 
The Tinker majority first concluded, in an oft-cited statement, “It can 
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights 
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”37  Noting that the 
case did “not relate to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, 
[or] to hair style,”38 the Court characterized the type of speech at issue as “pure 
speech.”39  In order to restrict a student’s speech, the school must show that the 
speech would “‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.’”40  Importantly, the 
school “must be able to show that its action was caused by something more 
than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint,”41 and that “school officials cannot 
suppress ‘expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to contend.’”42  
Thus, the Tinker Court afforded students broad First Amendment protection.43 
The Supreme Court retreated from Tinker’s broad protection of students’ 
free speech rights in Bethel School District v. Fraser.44  Fraser, a high school 
 
 34. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 506. 
 38. Id. at 507-08.  The regulations the Court chose to list are regulations one might typically 
expect to find at the primary and secondary school level, not at the post-secondary level. 
 39. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
 40. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)). 
 41. Id. (emphasis added). 
 42. Id. at 511 (quoting Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749). 
 43. Even Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, noted the expansiveness of the decision.  
See id. at 514-15 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating “I cannot share the Court’s uncritical 
assumption that, school discipline aside, the First Amendment rights of children are co-extensive 
with those of adults.”). 
 44. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).  For a more in-depth 
discussion of Fraser, see, for example, Royal C. Gardner, Note, Protecting a School’s Interest in 
Value Inculcation to the Detriment of Students’ Free Expression Rights: Bethel School District v. 
Fraser, 28 B.C. L. REV. 595 (1987).  Gardner analyzed the Fraser decision itself and the probable 
“chilling effect” of the decision.  Id. at 599.  In addition, Gardner noted the following, in 
anticipation of the Hazelwood decision: “Much of the uncertainty that Fraser will produce can be 
avoided if the Supreme Court narrows Fraser’s scope in its upcoming decision of Kuhlmeier v. 
Hazelwood School District.”  Id. at 624.  However, as this Note will demonstrate, Hazelwood has 
only created more confusion.  See also Philip J. Prygoski, Low Value Speech: From Young to 
Fraser, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 317, 345-53 (1987) (discussing the facts of the case and rationale of 
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student, used what the Court characterized as an “elaborate, graphic, and 
explicit sexual metaphor” in a speech he gave to nominate another student for a 
student elective office.45  Distinguishing the “political ‘message’” at issue in 
Tinker from the “sexual” message at issue in Fraser, the Court held that the 
“vulgar speech and lewd conduct [were] wholly inconsistent with the 
‘fundamental values’ of public school education” and “would undermine the 
school’s basic educational mission.”46  The Court’s reasoning is replete with 
references to age.  For example, the Court noted the following: 
The First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters of adult public 
discourse . . . .  It does not follow, however, that simply because the use of an 
offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the 
speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must be permitted to 
children in a public school . . . .  [T]he constitutional rights of students in 
public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in 
other settings.47 
In addition, the Court noted that “[t]he speech could well be seriously 
damaging to its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old 
and on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality.”48 
Like Fraser, Hazelwood also limited the First Amendment free speech 
rights of students at the high school level.49  The Court narrowly framed the 
issue in Hazelwood as “the extent to which educators may exercise editorial 
control over the contents of a high school newspaper produced as part of the 
school’s journalism curriculum.”50  Hazelwood school officials deleted two 
pages from the Spectrum, a newspaper written and edited by students in the 
 
the Court’s decision along with a critique of the Court’s analysis).  For a more modern analysis 
and interpretation of Fraser, see, for example, Miller, supra note 33, at 629-31, 654-60. 
 45. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677-78.  The nominating student delivered the following speech: 
“I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is 
firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. 
“Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in.  If necessary, he’ll take an 
issue and nail it to the wall.  He doesn’t attack things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing 
and pushing until finally—he succeeds. 
“Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and every one of 
you. 
“So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best 
our high school can be.” 
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting from the student’s nominating speech). 
 46. Id. at 685-86. 
 47. Id. at 682 (emphasis added). 
 48. Id. at 683 (emphasis added).  The Court went on to note that the Court’s “First 
Amendment jurisprudence has acknowledged limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the 
speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience 
may include children.”  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684 (emphasis added). 
 49. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 50. Id. at 262. 
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high school’s journalism class.51  The Spectrum’s principal deleted the two 
pages because, in addition to including articles the adviser did not object to, the 
pages also included stories about divorce and pregnancy, with references to 
sexual activity and birth control.52 
The Court first considered the issue of whether the Spectrum could be 
characterized as a public forum, for if it could, the speech contained therein 
would receive greater First Amendment protection.53  The Court found that the 
school, both in practice and in policy, intended for the Spectrum to be “part of 
the educational curriculum and a ‘regular classroom activit[y],’”54 and that the 
school “fail[ed] to demonstrate the ‘clear intent [required] to create a public 
forum.’”55  The Court explained that “school facilities may be deemed to be 
public forums only if school authorities have ‘by policy or by practice’ opened 
those facilities ‘for indiscriminate use by the general public,’ or by some 
segment of the public, such as student organizations.”56 
The Court distinguished Tinker as the issue in Tinker was whether the 
school was required to tolerate the student’s speech, whereas the issue in 
Hazelwood was whether the school would be required to affirmatively promote 
particular student speech.57  The Court defined the Tinker category as 
including “a student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the school 
premises,” whereas the Hazelwood category included speech that “members of 
the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school . . . 
[and] may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum . . . .”58  
School officials could regulate such “school-sponsored” speech falling into the 
Hazelwood category “so long as their actions are reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”59  In regulating the speech, school officials 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 263-64. 
 53. Id. at 267. 
 54. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268.  The Court listed the factors that influenced its 
determination: “[the adviser] selected the editors of the newspaper, scheduled publication dates, 
decided the number of pages for each issue, assigned story ideas to class members, advised 
students on the development of their stories, reviewed the use of quotations, edited stories, [etc.].”  
Id. 
 55. Id. at 270 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
802 (1985)). 
 56. Id. at 267 (quoting Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educ. Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 47, 46 
(1983)). 
 57. Id. at 271. 
 58. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.  The Court listed as examples of the Hazelwood category of 
speech “school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities.”  
Id.  The Court also noted that such activities could be characterized as part of the curriculum, 
“whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by 
faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and 
audiences.”  Id. 
 59. Id. at 273. 
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could “take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience.”60  
School officials, the Court noted, would be able to regulate speech dealing 
with the topics such as “the existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school 
setting . . . [and] the particulars of teenage sexual activity in a high school 
setting.”61  The Court intimated that courts could intervene only in the narrow 
category of circumstances where such purportedly school-sponsored activities 
serve “no valid educational purpose . . . [and] ‘directly and sharply 
implicate[]’” First Amendment principles.62 
In applying the standard, the Court found that it was reasonable for the 
school to have concluded that the students did not adequately master all of the 
requirements of the journalism class.63  Hence, the deleting of the two pages, 
even though they also contained unobjectionable content, was reasonably 
related to pedagogical interests under the deferential standard.64 
B. The Starting Point: Public Forum Analysis65 
After Hazelwood, the determination of how to analyze a student’s free 
speech claim became inextricably bound up with the public forum doctrine, for 
if the expressive activity occurs in a nonpublic forum, then Hazelwood will 
apply.66  Thus, after determining whether the interest at issue is speech under 
the First Amendment, a court must engage in a forum analysis to determine if 
the speech occurred in a traditional forum, a limited public forum, or a 
nonpublic forum.67  The Supreme Court delineated the basic forum doctrine in 
 
 60. Id. at 272. 
 61. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272. 
 62. Id. at 273 (citations omitted). 
 63. Id. at 276. 
 64. Id. at 276. 
 65. Please note that this is a complicated and unsettled area of the law that cannot be 
discussed in full here.  For a more in-depth analysis of the public forum doctrine and the 
complications that arise during its application, see Brian S. Black, Note, The Public School: 
Beyond the Fringes of Public Forum Analysis?,  36 VILL. L. REV. 831 (1991) (arguing that the 
public forum analysis should not have been incorporated into this area of the law); James M. 
Henderson, Sr., The Public Forum Doctrine in Schools, 69 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 529, 532, 534 
(1995) (arguing that the application of the public forum doctrine in the school setting is the 
“principal danger” to students’ First Amendment rights and noting that “[l]ower standards of 
scrutiny will be applied to governmental restrictions on student speech activities where one 
applies the public forum doctrine rather than Tinker and its progeny.”); Matthew D. McGill, Note, 
Unleashing the Limited Public Forum Analysis: A Modest Revision to a Dysfunctional Doctrine, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 929 (2000). 
 66. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56; see also Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 
346 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“Because we find that a forum analysis requires that the 
yearbook be analyzed as a limited public forum—rather than a nonpublic forum—we agree with 
the parties that Hazelwood has little application to this case.”). 
 67. Lee Rudy, Note, A Procedural Approach to Limited Public Forum Cases, 22 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1255, 1257-63 (1995). 
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the oft-cited case of Perry Educational Association v. Perry Local Educator’s 
Association.68  At one extreme are traditional public forums, which, under 
Perry, are “places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been 
devoted to assembly and debate.”69  Governmental regulation of the “time, 
place, and manner of expression” in these “quintessential public forums” is 
subject to three limitations: the regulation must be (1) “content-neutral” and 
espouse no viewpoint discrimination; (2) “narrowly tailored to serve a 
[compelling] government interest;” and (3) must “leave open ample alternative 
channels of communication.”70 
At the other extreme are nonpublic forums—forums that have not, either 
through “tradition or designation,” been declared public.71  In such forums, the 
time, manner, and place of expressive activity can be restricted “as long as the 
regulation[s] on speech [are] reasonable and not an effort to suppress 
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”72  
Thus, regulations in a nonpublic forum can be made based on content, but not 
on viewpoint.  As the Supreme Court explained in Cornelius v. NAACP: 
  Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter 
and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of 
the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.  Although a 
speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a 
topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum, or if he is not a 
 
 68. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).  In Perry, the 
Indiana Board of Education allowed one teachers’ union access to the interschool mail system 
and teacher mailboxes in Perry Township schools (based on a collective bargaining agreement), 
but denied access by all other teachers’ unions.  Id. at 39.  An excluded union alleged, in part, that 
this violated the teachers’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Id.  The Court held that the 
school mail system was not a public forum, for, inter alia, the “general public” could not use the 
mail system.  Id. at 47.  Thus, the Court analyzed whether the Board of Education’s restrictions 
were “reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves.”  Id. at 49.  Ultimately, 
the Court held that the policy and practice was reasonable, reasoning that (1) “providing exclusive 
access to recognized bargaining representatives is a permissible labor practice in the public 
sector,” and (2) there were alternative channels of communication available to the other unions.  
Perry, 460 U.S. at 51, 53. 
 69. Id. at 45.  Some examples of traditional public forums are streets and parks.  Id.  More 
examples of traditional public forums include “town squares, public sidewalks, and state and 
federal capitol complexes.”  Suzanne Stone Montgomery, Note, When the Klan Adopts-A-
Highway: The Weaknesses of the Public Forum Doctrine Exposed, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 557, 563 
(1999).  In the context of traditional public forums, the Court basically has made an a priori 
determination that “the citizen’s interest in free expression will . . . outweigh the state’s interest in 
preserving order.”  Rudy, supra note 67, at 1259. 
 70. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 71. Id. at 46.  “Examples of nonpublic forums are street light posts, prisons, military 
reservations, polling places, statutorially[sic]-required meetings of school administrators and a 
teachers union, and a school district’s internal mail system.”  Montgomery, supra note 69, at 568. 
 72. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
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member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was 
created, the government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to 
a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise 
includible subject.73 
The Court’s rationale for not allowing viewpoint discrimination is because of 
“the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate 
regulatory goal but to suppress unpopular ideas or information . . . .”74 
In the middle lies the “limited public forum,” created when the government 
opens an otherwise non-traditional, nonpublic forum “for use by the public as a 
place for expressive activity.”75  Although the government has the discretion to 
create a limited public forum, “[t]he Constitution forbids a state to enforce 
certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public . . . .”76  
Moreover, although the government “is not required to indefinitely retain the 
open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same 
standards as apply in a traditional public forum.”77  In a limited public forum, 
 
 73. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added).  At issue in Cornelius was “whether the Federal Government violates 
the First Amendment when it excludes legal defense and political advocacy organizations from 
participation in the Combined Federal Campaign . . . a charity drive aimed at federal employees.”  
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797-806.  President Kennedy issued an Executive Order allowing “[o]nly 
tax exempt, nonprofit charitable organizations that were supported by contributions from the 
public and that provided direct health and welfare services to individuals” to participate in the 
Campaign.  Id. at 792.  Among the groups excluded from participation included the NAACP, the 
Sierra Club, and the Federally Employed Women Legal Defense and Education Fund.  Id. at 793.  
After noting that “the charitable solicitation of funds” was a form of protected speech under the 
First Amendment, the Court analyzed whether the Combined Federal Campaign was a public 
forum.  Id. at 797-806.  The Court held that the Combined Federal Campaign was a nonpublic 
forum since it had been the government’s practice and policy to limit participation in the 
Campaign.  Id.  The Court further found that the government’s interest in avoiding “the 
appearance of political favoritism” provided a reasonable justification for excluding certain 
organizations.  Id. at 809. 
 74. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).  See also Rosenberger v. 
Rectors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“The government must abstain from 
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the 
speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”).  A circuit split has developed over whether the 
notion of viewpoint neutrality is required when analyzing nonpublic forums under the rubric of 
Hazelwood.  This issue will be analyzed more fully in this Note.  See infra Part IV.A.2.c. 
 75. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.  More specifically, a limited public forum can be “created by 
government designation of a place or channel of communication for use by the public at large for 
assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects.”  
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.  In some instances, courts have declared the following to be limited 
public forums: “university meeting facilities, municipal theaters, and school board meetings.”  
Montgomery, supra note 69, at 567. 
 76. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 77. Id. at 46. 
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the government is forbidden from exercising viewpoint discrimination.78  To 
determine whether a limited public forum has been created, a court must look 
to the “policy and practice of the government,”79 and “will not find that a 
[limited] public forum has been created in the face of clear evidence of a 
contrary intent . . . .”80 
However, even before determining how to characterize the forum, a court 
must determine what constitutes the forum.  The Supreme Court has expanded 
the definition of forum beyond the notion of a “physical situs” to include 
“intangible channels of communication” as well.81  A medium for expressive 
activity can constitute a forum, even if “more in a metaphysical than in a 
spatial or geographic sense . . . .”82  A court’s characterization of the forum at 
issue, then, can have a substantial impact on the outcome of any given case. 
C. Pre-Hazelwood Positions: Student Speech Safeguarded 
In 1972 and 1973, the Supreme Court decided two cases that defined the 
Court’s role in protecting the free speech rights of university students.  Unlike 
Hazelwood, these cases emphasized that the free speech rights of students were 
akin to the rights of those outside of the school setting.  Although the Justices 
recognized the competing interests of school officials in maintaining control, 
they provided much less deference to the university officials than was provided 
by the Hazelwood standard of “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
interests.”83 
In Healy v. James,84 students trying to form a chapter of the Students for a 
Democratic Society on the Central Connecticut State College campus claimed 
that their First Amendment rights of freedom of expression and association 
were violated when school officials refused to officially recognize the 
organization.85  The Court identified the collision of interests in the case as the 
 
 78. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.  A simple example illustrates the Court’s point: “When a 
government builds a theater, for example, it creates a limited public forum open to theatrical 
productions.  Other forms of expression, such as petitioning, would not be welcome in a theater, 
and they could therefore be excluded on a reasonable basis. The government cannot exclude a 
particular theatrical production from the theater, however, without a compelling justification.”  
Rudy, supra note 67, at 1261. 
 79. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. 
 80. Id. at 803 (emphasis added).  The Court also noted the following: “In cases where the 
principal function of the property would be disrupted by expressive activity, the Court is 
particularly reluctant to hold that the government intended to designate a public forum.”  Id. at 
804. 
 81. Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 476 (1st Cir. 
1989). 
 82. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830. 
 83. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
 84. 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
 85. Id. at 170. 
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interest of those, including the school officials, in an “environment free from 
disruptive interference with the educational process” and the “interest in the 
widest latitude for free expression and debate consonant with the maintenance 
of order.”86 
Citing Tinker, the Court reaffirmed the application of the First Amendment 
at the college and university level.87  It held that universities have the ability to 
prohibit “lawless action” as well as actions, per Tinker, that “materially and 
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.”88  Significantly, 
however, the Court relied on reasoning that was not present in Tinker, a high 
school level case.  For example, after discussing Tinker and the principles 
discussed therein, the Court noted that “the precedents of this Court leave no 
room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First 
Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than 
in the community at large.”89  The Court further explained, “While a college 
has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus . . . a ‘heavy 
burden’ rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that 
action.”90  This heavy burden would not be satisfied “simply because [school 
officials] find[] the views expressed . . . to be abhorrent.”91  Thus, although the 
Court did rely on a high school case, it defined the flexible and vague Tinker 
standard for the university setting. 
In Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri,92 a thirty-two 
year old graduate student claimed her First Amendment rights were violated 
when she was expelled from Journalism school after distributing a newspaper 
that included a political cartoon with profanity and a depiction of a policeman 
raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice.93  The Court relied on 
Healy for the proposition that the “mere dissemination of ideas—no matter 
how offensive to good taste—on a state university cammpus[sic] may not be 
shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’”94  The Court held that 
the only restrictions that the school could impose were reasonable time, 
manner, and place restrictions.95 
 
 86. Id. at 171. 
 87. Id. at 180. 
 88. Id. at 189 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)). 
 89. Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (emphasis added). 
 90. Id. at 184. 
 91. Id. at 187-88. 
 92. 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam). 
 93. Id. at 667. 
 94. Id. at 670. 
 95. Id. 
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D. Hazelwood Applied: Student Speech Stifled 
With the Hazelwood decision in hand—complete with the soon-to-be 
problematic footnote seven—it was time for the lower courts to grapple with 
defining the parameters of the Hazelwood doctrine, both at the pre-collegiate 
and post-secondary levels.  When confronted with pre-collegiate student free 
speech cases, lower courts applied the Hazelwood doctrine with consistency, 
however when confronted with post-secondary student speech cases, the only 
consistency that is apparent in the lower courts is confusion. 
1. Pre-collegiate Caselaw 
Lower courts have repeatedly applied Hazelwood to student speech at the 
high school level.96  In doing so, they have often relied on the peculiarities of 
the pre-collegiate audience to justify their decisions.97 
For example, in the 1989 case Virgil v. School Board of Columbia County, 
Florida,98 the Eleventh Circuit relied on Hazelwood in upholding a high school 
board’s decision to ban a textbook from a class because of its vulgar and 
sexual content.99  Although the court explicitly stated that it did not approve of 
the board’s decision, it nonetheless felt compelled to follow Hazelwood.100  In 
 
 96. See, e.g., McCann v. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist., 50 F. Supp. 2d 918 (E.D. Mo. 1999) 
(applying Hazelwood to uphold high school officials’ decision to prevent the high school 
marching band from performing “White Rabbit” as reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns because school officials reasonably believed it promoted the use of illegal drugs). 
 97. See, e.g., Henerey v. City of St. Charles, 200 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 1999).  In Henerey, a 
high school student running for student body president was disqualified after handing out 
condoms attached to stickers bearing his slogan, “Adam Henerey, The Safe Choice,” without first 
receiving permission.  Id. at 1131.  The court held that “the election was a school-sponsored 
activity that was a part of the school’s curriculum” and that the school had a legitimate 
pedagogical concern in “divorcing its extracurricular programs from controversial and sensitive 
topics, such as teenage sex.”  Id. at 1133, 1136.  The court went on to note that “there [can] be 
[no] . . . doubt that teenage sex is a controversial topic in the public schools,” evidenced by the 
fact that parents of primary and secondary school students have brought suits against school 
districts for exposing their children to “offensive or graphic materials without their consent.”  Id. 
at 1136.  See also Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 758, 763 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that 
Hazelwood applied to “discourteous” and “rude” remarks that a high school student made about 
his “schoolmasters” in a student assembly because “hurting the feelings of others” does not have 
a legitimate place in the high school curriculum). 
 98. 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 99. Id. at 1518.  The works banned by the school included classics such as “Lysistrata, 
written by the Greek dramatist Aristophanes in approximately 411 B.C., and The Miller’s Tale, 
written by the English poet Geoffrey Chaucer around 1380-1390 A.D.”  Id. at 1519.  According 
to the court, the works contained “passages of exceptional sexual explicitness.”  Id. at 1523.  The 
court recited portions of the works deemed by some commentators to have sexual overtones.  Id. 
at 1524 n.9. 
 100. Virgil, 863 F.2d at 1525.  The court stated: 
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deciding that the school board’s decision did not violate the Constitution, the 
court specifically took into account “the fact that most of the high school 
students involved ranged in age from fifteen to just over eighteen, and a 
substantial number had not yet reached the age of majority.”101  In doing so, 
the court restricted the applicability of Hazelwood to the high school level.102 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also applied Hazelwood to a high 
school student’s speech in Settle v. Dickson.103  A ninth-grade student, Brittney 
Settle, changed her paper topic from “Drama” to “The Life of Jesus Christ” 
without getting her teacher’s permission and, as a result, she received a zero on 
the paper.104  The Court, relying on Hazelwood, rejected the argument that her 
First Amendment free speech rights were violated.105  It held that school 
officials would not violate the First Amendment so long as they limited a 
student’s grades or speech as part of the curriculum and did not do so as a 
pretext for punishing the student.106  In coming to this conclusion, the court 
referred to Settle as a “young student” and noted that teachers “must daily 
decide . . . when it is time to stop writing or talking.”107  Both statements are 
indicative of a pre-collegiate, not a collegiate setting.  Importantly, the court 
also stated, “[l]earning is more vital in the classroom than free speech,” but, for 
reasons discussed below, such a view is inapposite in the college setting.108 
Moreover, in applying Hazelwood to the high school setting, many courts 
have interpreted Hazelwood very expansively.  For example, in Fleming v. 
Jefferson County School District,109 the Tenth Circuit held that “‘[t]he universe 
 
We decide today only that the Board’s removal of these works from the curriculum did 
not violate the Constitution.  Of course, we do not endorse the Board’s decision.  Like the 
district court, we seriously question how young persons just below the age of majority can 
be harmed by these masterpieces of Western literature.  However, having concluded that 
there is no constitutional violation, our role is not to second guess the wisdom of the 
Board’s action. 
Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1523 (“[W]e cannot conclude that the school board’s actions were not reasonably 
related to its legitimate concerns regarding the appropriateness (for this high school audience) of 
the sexuality and the vulgarity in these works.”) (emphasis added). 
 103. 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 104. Id. at 153-54. 
 105. Id. at 153. 
 106. Id. at 155. 
 107. Id. at 155-56. 
 108. Settle, 53 F.3d. at 156.  For reasons why such a view is inapposite in the post-secondary 
setting, see infra Part IV.A.1.b. 
 109. 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).  This case concerned Columbine High School, the 
Colorado high school where two students opened fire on their teachers and fellow classmates.  Id. 
at 920.  The school decided to allow students to place painted tiles around the school to help with 
the healing process.  Id. at 920-21.  However, “there could be no references to the attack, to the 
date of the attack . . . no names or initials of students, no Columbine ribbons, no religious 
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of legitimate pedagogical concerns is by no means confined to the 
academic . . . [for it includes] discipline, courtesy, and respect for 
authority.’”110  The court further explained, “the Hazelwood standard does not 
require that the guidelines be ‘the most reasonable or the only reasonable 
limitation[s],’ only that they be reasonable.”111  Because Hazelwood is 
susceptible to such an expansive interpretation, cases such as Fleming forecast 
the catastrophically detrimental chilling effect that would befall post-secondary 
students’ free speech rights if Hazelwood were to apply. 
2. Collegiate Caselaw 
a. Supreme Court Silence 
As earlier noted, the Supreme Court specifically reserved the question of 
whether the Hazelwood standard applies in the university setting.112  The Court 
has yet to revisit the issue.  However, the most recent Supreme Court case to 
provide an indication as to what the Court might decide in the future is Board 
of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth.113  In 
Southworth, University of Wisconsin students alleged, inter alia, that the 
mandatory student activity fee violated their First Amendment right of free 
speech because some of their money funded organizations that did not gain the 
students’ approval.114  Buried within a footnote in Justice Souter’s concurring 
opinion is the following statement: “[C]ases dealing with the right of teaching 
institutions to limit expressive freedom of students have been confined to high 
schools, whose students and their schools’ relations to them are different and 
at least arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college 
 
symbols, and nothing obscene or offensive.”  Id. at 921.  The plaintiffs wanted to place, inter alia, 
religious symbols on their tiles.  Id.  After noting that the “district court read Hazelwood as only 
applying ‘to activities conducted as part of the school curriculum,’” the Fleming court then stated 
the following: “We believe this reading of Hazelwood is too narrow.  We read the Court’s 
definition of ‘school-sponsored’ speech to mean activities that might reasonably be perceived to 
bear the imprimatur of the school and that involve pedagogical concerns.”  Fleming, 298 F.3d at 
924.  The court concluded that the project was school-sponsored speech, even though the 
“painting activity took place outside of school hours and was not mandatory,” and even despite a 
school official that had explicitly stated: “this is a project outside of the school, this is a separate 
project . . . .”  Id. at 930. 
 110. Id. at 925 (quoting Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1989)) (alterations in 
original). 
 111. Id. at 932 (quoting Hawkins v. City & County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 
1999)) (alterations in original). 
 112. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988). 
 113. 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
 114. Id. at 227.  In particular, some students objected to the school using their mandatory fees 
to fund organizations that engaged in political and ideological expression at odds with their own 
personal beliefs.  Id. 
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education.”115  Although this footnote is by no means controlling, it does 
suggest that the Court might uphold a distinction between the amount of 
deference to school officials at the pre-collegiate and collegiate levels when 
First Amendment rights are at stake. 
b. Lower Court Applications and Misapplications 
A 2001 case, Hosty v. Governors State University, is particularly indicative 
of the confusion that has resulted in the lower courts from Hazelwood’s 
unanswered footnote seven.116  In Hosty, GSU students and former editors and 
writers of the school’s student newspaper, the Innovator, claimed that school 
officials violated their First Amendment free speech rights.117  In particular, 
they alleged that the school officials violated their rights when, among other 
things, the officials denied them access to computer software and manuals, 
temporarily removed an Innovator computer without permission, and failed to 
investigate break-ins.118  In ruling on the various defendants’ motions for 
summary judgment, the court addressed Hazelwood and concluded, contrary to 
what the defendants argued, that it did not “cast doubt” on the cases cited by 
the plaintiffs in support of their position.119 
First, the court distinguished Hazelwood because, unlike the newspaper in 
Hazelwood, the students retained editorial control over the Innovator and it 
was not part of a class.120  Thus, the court intimated that if the facts of the case 
had been different—specifically, if the Innovator was part of the educational 
curriculum—Hazelwood could have applied.  However, in the next few 
sentences, the court seemed to contradict the implication that Hazelwood might 
apply at the post-secondary level.  Citing footnote seven, the court also 
distinguished Hazelwood on the basis that it involved a high school rather than 
 
 115. Id. at 238 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  A similar 
point was made in the 1992 Supreme Court case of Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  In Lee, 
a public school student and her father brought a suit against the child’s school district for its 
practice of including clergy-led invocations and benedictions in the form of prayer at the school-
sponsored graduation ceremonies.  Id. at 580-81.  In holding that such a practice was 
unconstitutional, the Court reasoned, in relevant part: 
We do not address whether that choice [of participating in or protesting the graduation 
ceremony] is acceptable if the affected citizens are mature adults, but we think the State 
may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary school 
children in this position.  Research in psychology supports the common assumption that 
adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity . . . . 
Id. at 593. 
 116. Hosty v. Governors State Univ., 2001 WL 1465621 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2001). 
 117. Id. at *1. 
 118. Id. at *4. 
 119. Id. at *7. 
 120. Id. 
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a college or university.121  Thus, the court implied that the deferential 
Hazelwood standard would not apply to college and university free speech 
cases.  Ultimately, the court did not resolve these conflicting implications.  As 
has happened in many other cases, the court searched for guidance, found 
none, did not resolve the question, and left the students, school officials, and 
attorneys who must rely on the decision, in a state of confusion. 
Some courts, however, have left no one wondering whether Hazelwood 
will or should apply at the post-secondary level.  For example, in 1989, the 
First Circuit confronted the issue in Student Government Association v. Board 
of Trustees of the University of Massachusetts.122  In its opinion, the court 
stated, “Hazelwood . . . is not applicable to college newspaper cases.”123 
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit confronted the Hazelwood issue in Kincaid v. 
Gibson.124  Kentucky State University students claimed that their First 
Amendment rights were violated when school officials confiscated and refused 
to distribute student-produced yearbooks.125  The Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decided that the yearbook constituted a limited public forum, and was 
thus subject only to reasonable time, manner, and place regulations, and not to 
the deferential Hazelwood standard, as the district court concluded.126  Judge 
Cole, speaking for the majority, stated: 
The danger of “chilling . . . individual thought and expression is especially real 
in the University setting, where the State acts against a background and 
tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and 
philosophic tradition.” . . .  The university environment is the quintessential 
“marketplace of ideas,” which merits full, or indeed heightened, First 
Amendment protection . . . .  In addition to the nature of the university setting, 
we find it relevant that The Thorobred and its readers are likely to be young 
adults . . . .  Thus, there can be no justification for suppressing the yearbook on 
the grounds that it might be “unsuitable for immature audiences.”127 
 
 121. Hosty, 2001 WL 1465621, at *7. 
 122. 868 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1989).  Students from the University of Massachusetts alleged that 
university officials violated their free speech rights when the university got rid of the Legal 
Services Office, which provided legal education and advice to students.  Id. at 474-75.  The court 
ultimately held that this case was to be decided using subsidy caselaw.  Id. at 477. 
 123. Id. at 480 n.6 (citations omitted). 
 124. 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
 125. Id. at 345.  The Vice President for Student Affairs, Gibson, objected to the color of the 
yearbook’s cover and theme, and criticized the publication for its lack of captions and the 
“inclusion of current events ostensibly unrelated to Kentucky State University.”  Id. 
 126. Id. at 346, 348. 
 127. Id. at 352 (citations omitted).  In coming to its conclusion, the court also noted that The 
Thorobred was not a “closely-monitored classroom activity.”  Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 352. 
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Although the court did not explicitly reject the applicability of Hazelwood in 
the college setting,128 the language arguably suggests that the Sixth Circuit 
might refuse to apply Hazelwood in the future. 
Moreover, in the 1990 case of DiBona v. Matthews,129 a community 
college student and his teacher brought an action against the college, alleging 
that their First Amendment rights had been violated when the school cancelled 
a drama class because of the content of the play that was to be performed.130  
The court began its constitutional analysis by noting that nearly all the prior 
cases dealing with the power of school officials to regulate the content of 
drama productions or written materials “involved minors rather than adult 
colleges.”131  Instead of relying on Hazelwood, the court looked to the pre-
Hazelwood collegiate cases to support its conclusion that the school officials 
could not cancel the class and prohibit the production of the play.132  After 
noting that Hazelwood had specifically reserved the question of whether its 
deferential standard would apply at the college level, the court rejected the 
college’s argument that they should be given the same power to regulate 
school curriculum as elementary and secondary school officials: 
[W]here children are concerned the legitimate role of the government in 
regulating speech is substantially broader . . . .  In contrast, as the Supreme 
Court explained in [Healy], “[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for 
the view that . . . First Amendment protections should apply with less force on 
college campuses than in the community at large.”133 
The DiBona court did not stop there, however.  It continued its attack on 
the applicability of the Hazelwood standard: 
We question whether the rationale underlying the “school sponsorship” rule 
would allow its wholesale extension to educational settings involving adults.  
 
 128. See id. at 346 n.5 (“Because we find that a forum analysis requires that the yearbook be 
analyzed as a limited public forum—rather than a nonpublic forum—we agree with the parties 
that Hazelwood has little application to this case.”). 
 129. 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 130. Id. at 1333-38.  The court’s record recited a description of the play, entitled “Split 
Second”: 
The play concerns a Black New York City police officer who, in the course of a routine 
arrest of a White suspect, is subjected to a flurry of racial slurs and epithets.  In a split-
second loss of control, the officer shoots and kills the suspect.  He then places a knife in 
the hand of the victim and fabricates a story that the shooting was in self-defense. 
Id. at 1333.  Church leaders in the community objected to the content of the play.  Id. 
 131. Id. at 1345. 
 132. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1346.  For example, the court relied on the following 
language from Papish to support its conclusion: “We think Healy makes it clear that the mere 
dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state university campus 
may not be shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’” Id. (quoting Papish v. Univ. 
of Mo. Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973)). 
 133. Id. (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)). 
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The general public is likely to view school-sponsored student speech as 
bearing the “imprimatur of the school” . . . because of the greater control 
elementary and secondary schools exercise over the conduct of minor students.  
[The school officials] have cited no authority—and we are aware of none—
which would allow a college or university to censor instructor-selected 
curriculum materials because they contain “indecent” language or deal with 
“offensive” topics.134 
Ultimately, the court concluded that although school sponsorship is one factor 
that may be considered under some circumstances at the college level, unlike at 
the pre-collegiate level, it is not controlling and will not automatically lead to 
deference to the school’s legitimate pedagogical interests.135  Thus, according 
to the DiBona court, the Hazelwood standard will not apply in the college 
setting—at least not in its traditional form. 
Many courts have reached similar conclusions when addressing the issue 
of whether Hazelwood applies outside of the context of a collision between the 
university’s rights and the students’ free speech rights.  For example, in Scallet 
v. Rosenblum,136 a case addressing the scope of a university instructor’s in-
class free speech rights when they collided with the university’s interests, a 
Virginia District Court refused to apply the Hazelwood standard.137  In making 
this determination, the court opined: 
 
 134. Id. at 1346-47 (citations omitted). 
 135. Id. at 1347-48.  The court, however, failed to identify under what circumstances school 
sponsorship could be considered at the college level.  DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1346-47.  In 
the end, the court held that the school officials’ decision to not allow the play to be performed 
was unconstitutional, noting the following: 
[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without 
also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.  Indeed, governments 
might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for 
banning the expression of unpopular views.  We have been able . . . to discern little social 
benefit that might result from running the risk of opening the door to such grave results. 
Id. at 1348 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)) (alterations in original). 
 136. 911 F. Supp. 999 (W.D. Va. 1996). 
 137. Id. at 1011.  The plaintiff, a non-tenured instructor, alleged that the school failed to 
renew his contract “in retaliation for his outspokenness on issues of ‘diversity’” at the Graduate 
School.  Id.  Scallet was somewhat of a progressive instructor, known for “champion[ing], among 
other things, the goal of broadening both the traditional focus of classroom materials so as to 
make them more accessible to women and minorities, and the traditional underpinnings of the 
business community itself, so as to make that sphere more hospitable to the same.”  Id. at 1004.  
Noting that past precedent provided no “clear guidance,” the court ultimately applied the 
Pickering balancing test—a Supreme Court test for determining the amount of protection 
afforded teachers’ out-of-class speech—to determine if the instructor’s in-class speech was 
protected.  Id. at 1011.  Under Pickering, courts must balance “the interests of the [employee], as 
a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”  
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).  Per the terms of this test, the court 
concluded that the instructor’s in-class speech regarding “diversity” bordered at times on sexual 
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[T]he “significant interests” discussed in Hazelwood that justify the restriction, 
in certain instances, of . . . [First Amendment] speech, are not implicated to the 
same extent, if at all, in the context of higher education.  Certainly the interest 
in assuring “that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be 
inappropriate for their level of maturity” is not implicated in the graduate 
school context.138 
In contrast to these cases, various courts have not altogether dismissed the 
concept of Hazelwood at the university level.139  For example, in Leuth v. St. 
Clair County Community College,140 the former editor-in-chief of a student-run 
newspaper, the Gazette, challenged the community college officials’ decision 
to prohibit the inclusion of an advertisement for a Canadian nude dancing 
club.141  Although the court held that the newspaper, a forum for public 
expression, would be governed by regulations for commercial speech, it 
discussed the Hazelwood standard and extensively compared the student 
newspaper at issue in Hazelwood to the Gazette.142  By discussing the 
Hazelwood analysis and not dismissing it as inapplicable, the inference is that 
the court would have applied the Hazelwood standard had the speech been 
deemed “school-sponsored.”143 
 
harassment, and was actually disruptive to the school’s pedagogical mission.  Scallet, 911 F. 
Supp. at 1020. 
 138. Id. at 1011 (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271). 
 139. In addition to student rights cases, many cases have addressed the collision of 
college/university professors’ free speech rights with university interests.  See, e.g., Vanderhurst 
v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 208 F.3d 908 (10th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that the question of 
whether Hazelwood applied at the university or college level was unresolved, but nonetheless 
applying the Hazelwood analysis to college professor’s classroom speech because both parties 
stipulated that it did apply).  See also Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).  In 
Bishop, the court held that a university professor’s First Amendment rights were not violated by a 
school official’s memo that restricted his rights to talk about religious beliefs or preferences 
during class, and prevented him from conducting optional classes to discuss religion.  Id. at 1075-
77.  To make this determination, the court noted, “insofar as [the Hazelwood standard] covers the 
extent to which an institution may limit in-school expressions which suggest the school’s 
approval, we adopt the Court’s reasoning as suitable to our ends, even at the university level.”  Id. 
at 1074.  Thus the court adopted the Hazelwood analysis, albeit in a modified form.  See id. at 
1074-75 (discussing the three considerations that the court would balance).  The court specifically 
noted that it would give more weight to the professor’s rights than they “concluded [was] proper 
under Kuhlmeier.”  Id. at 1072 n.5.  See also Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1010 n.11 (discussing the 
Bishop court’s unique balancing test at length). 
 140. 732 F. Supp. 1410 (E.D. Mich. 1990). 
 141. Id. at 1412. 
 142. Id. at 1414-15. 
 143. There have been many other cases that have addressed the collision of college/university 
students’ free speech rights with university interests where this inference holds true.  See, e.g., 
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 216 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing Hazelwood at 
length, but concluding that the Tinker analysis would apply because the school’s anti-harassment 
policy “cover[ed] far more than just the Hazelwood-type school-sponsored speech.”).  Cf. 
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E. Beyond Hazelwood 
The Supreme Court and lower courts also have recognized differences in 
the primary/secondary and undergraduate/graduate educational settings outside 
of the context of First Amendment free speech cases.  For example, in 
Benefield v. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama,144 a female 
student alleged that the college she attended was liable under Title IX for 
failing to prevent her from engaging in sexual activity on campus, which 
negatively impacted her class work.145  However, the court refused to find the 
school liable, reasoning: 
[R]egardless of their age, a college does not have the same obligation to its 
students as does a high school.  Even though a 15, 16 or 17 year old may be 
found at either institution, the institutions have uniquely different obligations 
to their students, regardless of the overlap in ages.146 
. . . . 
[T]he authoritarian role of today’s college administrators has been notably 
diluted in recent decades.  Trustees, administrators, and faculties have been 
required to yield to the expanding rights and privileges of their students . . . . 
College students today are no longer minors; they are now regarded as adults 
in almost every phase of community life.147 
Distinctions based on students’ educational levels are also prevalent in the 
arena of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.148  For example, one court noted 
the following: 
  There is a large body of limited open public forum/Establishment Clause 
case law in the context of university students.  The cases find that in the 
context of university students, permitting religious speech and meetings on a 
 
Marianello v. Bushby, No. CIV.A.1:95CV167-D-D, 1996 WL 671410 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 1996) 
(where the court made no mention of Hazelwood, but applied Settle to the graduate student’s 
criticism and commentary of his professors during the appeals process for an unfavorable grade 
he received). 
 144. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (N.D. Ala. 2002). 
 145. Id. at 1217.  The student was able to attend the university based on a scholarship she 
received.  Id. at 1213.  She lived on campus, and on several occasions, after consuming alcohol, 
was sexually exploited by football and basketball players.  Id. at 1213-14.  As a result of her 
activities on campus, her GPA was very low and she eventually had to be placed in a drug 
rehabilitation center for adolescents.  Id. at 1215.  Moreover, the student denied any participation 
in the sexual encounters.  Benefield, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1214. 
 146. Id. at 1223 (emphasis added). 
 147. Id. at 1223-24 (quoting Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979)) (alteration 
in original). 
 148. E.g., Chris Brown, Note, Good News?  Supreme Court Overlooks the Impressionability 
of Elementary-Aged Students in Finding a Parental Permission Slip Sufficient to Avoid an 
Establishment Clause Violation, Good News Club v. Milford Central, 27 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
269, 283-86 (2001). 
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university campus would confer no imprimatur of state approval of religious 
practices because of the nature of university students (i.e. mature and less 
impressionable).  However, other cases have distinguished the university 
setting from that of a high school, finding that a high school presents 
“heightened dangers in the context of the Establishment Clause.” 
  Unlike a university, where it is generally understood that a student is, with 
reason, responsible for the conduct of his or her own affairs, the behavior of a 
high school student is subject to the constant regulation and affirmative 
supervision of adult school authorities.149 
Finally, in Carboni v. Meldrum,150 the court talked about such a distinction 
in the context of the Fourth Amendment.151  In Carboni, a graduate student 
was stripped searched because school officials suspected her of going to the 
restroom during a test, looking at hidden notes, and concealing them on her 
person when she was caught.152  In analyzing whether the school’s actions 
violated the graduate student’s rights, the court stated: 
[A] body search of a graduate student in her late twenties undertaken at the 
direction of a university professor and Dean is arguably different from the 
same search performed on a fourteen (14) year old high school freshman by a 
Vice-Principal.  Though higher education administrators must be allowed to 
make discretionary decisions, university officials simply do not exercise the 
same level of disciplinary control over their students as do public school 
teachers and principals.153 
Thus, the distinction referenced to by the Supreme Court in past cases such 
as Southworth and recognized by many lower courts permeates more than just 
First Amendment free speech jurisprudence. 
 
 149. Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, No. 90-C6604, 1991 WL 2458, at 
*8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 1991) (citations omitted).  See also Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of 
Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 260 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[P]ublic secondary and elementary school 
administrators are granted more leeway than public colleges and universities or legislative bodies, 
e.g., municipalities, states, and Congress.”). 
 150. 949 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Va. 1996). 
 151. Id. at 434-35. 
 152. Id. at 430-31. 
 153. Id. at 434 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Ultimately, the court did not find a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures 
because school administrators, based on the overwhelming evidence, “could have reasonably 
concluded they were entitled to do [the search] under the circumstances” and because the scope 
was limited.  Id. at 435-36. 
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III.  BROWN V. LI: A DETRIMENTAL DISACKNOWLEDGMENT 
A. Facts of Brown v. Li 
The controversy in Brown v. Li centered around a “Disacknowledgments” 
section that Christopher Brown, a master’s degree candidate in the Department 
of Material Sciences at the University of California, at Santa Barbara, included 
with his thesis.154  Brown’s “Disacknowledgments” section expressed the 
opposite sentiment that one might expect to see in the acknowledgment section 
of a thesis.  Instead of praising those who aided him in the completion of his 
thesis and supported him throughout the process, Brown began his 
“Disacknowledgments” section in the following manner: “I would like to offer 
special Fuck You’s to the following degenerates for of [sic] being an ever-
present hindrance during my graduate career.”155  Brown then proceeded to 
name “the Dean and staff of the UCSB graduate school, the managers of [the 
school’s] [l]ibrary, former California Governor Wilson, the Regents of the 
University of California, and ‘Science’ as having been particularly obstructive 
to [his] progress toward his graduate degree.”156 
Brown felt that he had the freedom to include such a section in the opening 
of his thesis because of the wording of the University’s “Guide to Filing 
Theses and Dissertations.”157  In addition to setting guidelines for the content 
and structure of the actual thesis,158 the Guide said the following about an 
 
 154. Brown v. Li, 299 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 308 F.3d 939, 941-43 (9th Cir. 
2002).  The original decision in Brown was released on August 12, 2002, but it was amended and 
superceded in October 2002.  In addition to bringing claims under the federal constitution, Brown 
also alleged violations of his rights under the California constitution.  Id. at 946.  In its original 
decision, the district court did not indicate whether it considered and dismissed the state law 
claim or whether its decision was based solely on Brown’s federal claims.  Id. at 955.  The Ninth 
Circuit, in its August decision, did not address this claim either.  As a result, the Ninth Circuit 
amended its decision in October, noting the vagueness in the district court’s opinion, and thus 
remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the state law claims.  Id.  Brown filed a 
petition for grant of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.  Cert. denied, Brown v. 
Li, 123 S. Ct. 1488 (2003). 
 155. Brown, 308 F.3d at 943. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 942, 952. 
 158. Id. at 942.  This portion of the Guide seemed to be aimed only at the actual thesis itself, 
and not at the content of the optional “Acknowledgments” section.  The Guide noted that “‘Each 
discipline has a relatively standard method of presenting research results so that other researchers 
can find and build on past work.”  Id. (emphasis added).  An “Acknowledgment” or 
“Disacknowledgment” section arguably has nothing to do with future researchers being able to 
build upon the student’s work.  The court, however, went on to note that “[w]ith respect to the 
content of a thesis or dissertation, the Guide states: ‘You and your committee are responsible for 
everything between the margins.  The organization, presentation, and documentation of your 
research should meet the standards for publishing journal articles or monographs in your 
field . . . .’”  Brown, 308 F.3d at 942.  By emphasizing “and your committee,” the court seemed to 
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optional “Dedication and/or Acknowledgments” section of a student thesis: 
“‘You may wish to dedicate this work to someone special to you or to 
acknowledge particular persons who helped you.  Within the usual margin 
restrictions, any format is acceptable for these pages.”159  Brown understood 
this to mean that the student had complete discretion in determining the 
contents of this optional section—”that the student ‘may’ dedicate the thesis to 
someone special or give thanks to the helpful individuals in the section, or the 
student ‘may’ use the section to communicate some other message.”160 
In the spring of 1999, Brown submitted his thesis, entitled “The 
Morphology of Calcium Carbonate: Factors Affecting Crystal Shape,” to his 
three-member Committee.161  This version of his thesis did not include the 
controversial “Disacknowledgments” section.162  In fact, Brown specifically 
did not submit his “Disacknowledgments” to the members of the thesis 
committee because “he feared that they would not approve [the section].”163  
 
suggest that the committee should retain control over the entire thesis including the 
“Acknowledgements” section.  However, a more accurate reading of this section of the Guide 
suggests it is aimed at the presentation of the candidate’s research, rather than the candidate’s 
optional Acknowledgments. Guidelines for Acknowledgements is in a separate section of the 
Guide, and seems to rely upon considerations independent from those directed at the candidate’s 
research.  Id. at 942.  Thus, the section should not be read to regulate the “Acknowledgements 
section,” or, as in Brown’s case, his “Disacknowledgments.”  Contrary to what the court suggests, 
the section of the guide that speaks to committee oversight does not automatically mandate the 
conclusion that Brown had no freedom of speech and that the committee retained control over the 
optional “Acknowledgments” section. 
 159. Id. (emphasis added).  The court also cited a passage from a style manual that was 
referred to in a different portion of the Guide—not in the “Acknowledgment” guidelines section.  
Id.  According to this style manual, “‘In the acknowledgments, the writer thanks mentors and 
colleagues, lists the individuals or institutions that supported the research, and gives credit to 
works cited in the text for which permission to reproduce has been granted.’”  Id. (citing KATE L. 
TURABIAN, A MANUAL FOR WRITERS OF TERM PAPERS, THESES, AND DISSERTATIONS §§ 1.9, 
1.26 (6th ed. 1996)).  However, the court’s reliance on the Turabian manual is misplaced.  First, 
in many other instances, the University did not follow such a guideline.  Brown, 308 F.3d at 946.  
For instance, some students thanked “God” or their “pets.”  Id.  Another student made reference 
to, inter alia, “the dips**ts who decided to put the P chemists on the forth [sic] floor” and “the 
dumb ass who left his cooling water ON . . . and subsequently flooded my lab, desk, and my most 
important files: may your bloated, limb-less bodies wash to shore and be picked clean by seabirds 
and maggots . . . .”  Id. at 967 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).  All of these 
student’s “Acknowledgements” sections were approved, although the Turabian manual would 
seem to dictate a contrary result.  Id. at 943.  Moreover, even if the Turabian manual’s definition 
of the “Acknowledgments” section was authoritative, it constitutes impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination.  See infra Part IV.A.2.b. 
 160. Brown, 308 F.3d at 952-53.  Again, even if this view was rejected, the limitation of the 
“Acknowledgements” section based on the speaker’s viewpoint could still be declared 
unconstitutional.  See infra Part IV.A.2.b. 
 161. Brown, 308 F.3d at 943. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
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After obtaining approval of his thesis from the thesis committee, Brown 
inserted the “Disacknowledgments” section, and attempted to file his thesis 
with the library.  However, the library noticed the added section and contacted 
the Dean of the Graduate Division of the School, Dean Li, who withheld 
Brown’s degree and referred the matter to Brown’s thesis committee.164 
Brown then drafted an alternative “Disacknowledgments” section, which 
omitted the profanity used in the original draft, but the thesis committee still 
refused to approve his thesis.165  In a memorandum of its decision, the 
committee noted that Brown’s section “did not meet professional standards for 
publication in the field,”166 and concluded that “the addition or removal of 
material from a dissertation after the examination, evaluation and signed 
approval of the original materials . . . is unacceptable . . . .”167  Dean Li also 
wrote Brown notifying him that his thesis would be approved as soon as he 
removed the “Disacknowledgments” section.168 
Instead of complying with Dean Li’s ultimatum, however, Brown appealed 
to the Academic Affairs Committee of the Department of Material Sciences.  
The Committee denied Brown’s appeal, reasoning “that the entire paper, not 
merely the technical content of the thesis, was subject to the review and 
approval of the thesis committee,”169 and that the thesis committee members 
had the “right[] . . . not to be associated, through their approval, with the 
content of the ‘Disacknowledgments’ section.”170  Brown’s appeals to the 
Associate Dean of the Graduate Division, the University’s Graduate Council, 
and the Academic Freedom Committee were likewise unsuccessful.171  In 
January 2000, Brown’s degree was withheld, and he was put on academic 
probation.172 
 
 164. Id. at  943.  Filing the thesis with the library was a prerequisite to earning a degree.  Id. 
 165. Brown, 308 F.3d at 943. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 944.  In its memo, the thesis committee also “determined”—with recommendation 
from counsel—that the manuscript was not a “public forum.”  Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Brown, 308 F.3d at 944.  The Academic Affairs Committee went on to state that “An 
Acknowledgement section in a scientific paper is relevant only as a vehicle for the author to give 
proper credit to people or organizations that have contributed to make possible the technical work 
being reported . . . [and] the student is given a certain latitude in a thesis to thank his/her parents, 
spouse, family or close friends . . . .”  Id.  Again, however, this reasoning is inconsistent with the 
action of the University on other occasions; nowhere does this definition allow for praise of pets 
or criticism of faculty, administration, or staff.  See supra note 159. 
 170. Brown, 308 F.3d at 944-45.  However, this argument is subject to much criticism.  See 
infra Part IV.A.2.a. 
 171. Brown, 308 F.3d at 945.  These individuals/panels basically reiterated the arguments 
made by the Academic Affairs Committee.  See supra text accompanying notes 1665-67.  The 
Academic Freedom Council’s decision rested mainly on the reasoning that Brown had “failed to 
follow [the] rules.”  Brown, 308 F.3d at 945. 
 172. Id. 
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In the meantime, the media caught wind of the brewing controversy, and 
on May 11, 2000, a producer for “ABC’s Nightly News with Peter Jennings” 
contacted Brown.173  On May 14, University officials spoke with the 
producer.174  On May 15, Brown was interviewed.175  On May 16, Brown 
received a letter from Federal Express—the University had decided to award 
his degree, even though the “Disacknowledgments” section had not been 
removed from the thesis.176  However, at the time Brown filed suit, he had not 
provided the library with an approved version of the thesis without the 
“Disacknowledgments,” so his thesis was not displayed in the library 
according to UCSB’s usual custom.177 
In June of 2000, Brown filed a section 1983 action in the Ninth Circuit 
alleging, inter alia, “that [the Dean of the University’s Graduate Division, the 
Chancellor of the University, the members of his thesis committee, and the 
Director of the University’s library] violated his First Amendment rights by 
‘withholding’ his degree by their ‘conduct.’”178 
 
 173. Id. at 966 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Brown, 308 F.3d at 966.  The University contended that “the timing was a coincidence.”  
Id. 
 177. Id. at 945. 
 178. Id.  Brown also claimed that the defendants violated his procedural due process rights by 
failing to give him a formal hearing and that their actions in mandating that he remove the 
“Disacknowledgments” section violated the California state constitution.  Id. at 945-46.  A 
majority of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment on the procedural due process claim.  Brown, 308 F.3d at 955, 956.  At the time of the 
writing of this Note, the court of appeals had remanded the state law claims for consideration by 
the district court, because the district court was silent as to the state law claims.  Id. at 955.  This 
Note will only analyze the First Amendment claim. 
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B. Judge Graber’s Denial of Disacknowledgments: No Viable First 
Amendment Claim179 
Reviewing the district court’s summary judgment for the school de novo, 
Judge Graber began by laying out the standard for determining whether the 
University officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the First 
Amendment claim.180  Judge Graber then addressed the merits of Brown’s 
argument that the defendant’s decision to refuse to approve the 
“Disacknowledgments” section “demonstrate[d] a violation of his clearly 
established First Amendment rights.”181  Recognizing that there was “no 
precedent precisely on point,” Judge Graber then analyzed the threshold legal 
question: does the deferential Hazelwood standard apply in the post-secondary 
setting?182 
1. Hazelwood is the Most Analogous Case to Brown 
Ultimately, Judge Graber concluded that Hazelwood did apply, reasoning 
that it properly “balances a university’s interest in academic freedom and a 
student’s First Amendment rights.”183  She first analyzed the Hazelwood 
decision itself to reach this conclusion.184  After summarizing the holding of 
the case, Judge Graber focused on the language from Hazelwood that led the 
Court to determine that the school newspaper was part of the curriculum and 
 
 179. Note that the decision in Brown is a plurality decision.  Id. at 956-57.  Justices Graber 
and Ferguson both concluded that Brown’s First Amendment rights were not violated, but applied 
differing legal standards.  Id. at 957.  This Note will not focus on Judge Ferguson’s concurrence.  
Judge Ferguson summarized the situation as follows: “ . . . the guy cooked the books, (his 
master’s thesis), got caught, and now wants to shield his misbehavior under the umbrella of the 
First Amendment.”  Id. at 955 (Ferguson, J., concurring).  Instead of addressing the issue of 
whether Hazelwood applied to Brown’s case, Judge Ferguson characterized the case as one of 
deception, focusing on Brown’s “dishonest addition of the ‘Disacknowledgments,’” and 
concluded that Brown could not “cheat and then seek to evade accountability through the First 
Amendment.”  Brown, 308 F.3d at 955.  As the dissent aptly noted, however, “the record . . . [did] 
not support this conclusion.  The university’s offer to afford Brown all of the same benefits that 
he would have received before he ‘cheated’ if he would simply remove the offending material 
from his thesis belies the argument that the sanctions were imposed to punish him for cheating.”  
Id. at  965 n.7 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
 180. Id. at 946-47.  In particular, Judge Graber noted that the court would have to apply a 
three-part test: (1) whether “the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right”, (2) whether 
the right “was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation”; and (3) “whether an 
objectively reasonable government actor would have known that his or her conduct violated the 
plaintiff’s constitutional right.”  Id.  (citing Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1012-13 
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)). 
 181. Id. at 947. 
 182. Brown, 308 F.3d at 947. 
 183. Id. at 952. 
 184. Id. at 947-48. 
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not a public forum.185  Judge Graber noted that the Court so concluded because 
the newspaper was “‘supervised by faculty members and designed to impart 
particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences;’”186 thus, 
school officials could regulate student speech provided it was “‘reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’”187 
Before discussing the specific applicability of Hazelwood, the court 
analogized Brown’s case to Settle v. Dickson, where the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals applied Hazelwood.188  In Settle, a ninth-grade student received 
approval for her paper topic, changed topics without the knowledge of the 
teacher, and then claimed her First Amendment rights were violated when she 
received no credit for the paper.189  Reciting the deferential standard once 
more, Judge Graber concluded that “Hazelwood and Settle lead to the 
conclusion that an educator can, consistent with the First Amendment, require 
that a student comply with the terms of an academic assignment,”190 
notwithstanding the fact that both cases involved student speech at the pre-
collegiate level. 
Curiously, however, Judge Graber did not address the underlying policy 
reasons for applying Hazelwood in the post-secondary setting.  Noting a lack 
of Supreme Court guidance on the issue, Judge Graber took the position that 
Hazelwood, even if it was not the correct standard to apply, was the best.191 
2. Curricular Versus Extra-curricular Expressive Activities. 
Providing support for her argument, Judge Graber reasoned that the post-
collegiate cases in the First and Sixth Circuits that had distinguished 
Hazelwood and held that the deferential standard did not apply at the collegiate 
level were themselves distinguishable from Brown.192  Because those cases 
involved extracurricular activities, and Brown involved curriculum-related 
 
 185. Id. at 947-48. 
 186. Id. at 947 (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271). 
 187. Brown, 308 F.3d at 949 (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 273). 
 188. Id. at 948.  For a more in-depth discussion of Settle, see supra text accompanying notes 
103-108. 
 189. Id. at 948  (citing Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 154-55 (6th Cir. 
1995)). 
 190. Id. at 949. 
 191. Id. at 951.  Judge Graber noted the following: 
We do not know with certainty that the Supreme Court would hold that Hazelwood 
controls the inquiry into whether a university’s requirements for and an evaluation of a 
student’s curricular speech infringe that student’s First Amendment rights.  Nevertheless, 
of all the Supreme Court’s cases, Hazelwood appears to be the most analogous to the 
present case. 
Brown, 308 F.3d at 951. 
 192. Id. at 949 (citing Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Student 
Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1989)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1214 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:1185 
student speech, Kincaid and Student Government Association were not 
controlling.193 
The Supreme Court, noted Judge Graber, never articulated the appropriate 
standard for reviewing a university’s regulation of post-secondary student 
speech that is related to a school’s curriculum; thus, it remained an open 
question whether Hazelwood applied.194  Judge Graber argued that a review of 
Supreme Court precedent showed that the Court upheld the curricular-
extracurricular distinction in other contexts, indicating that the Court might 
continue to do so if confronting a free speech case in the university setting.195  
The precedents showed, argued Judge Graber, that “the curriculum of a public 
educational institution is one means by which the institution itself expresses its 
policy, a policy with which others do not have a constitutional right to 
interfere.”196  Judge Graber expanded her argument by citing to academic 
freedom cases.  In addition, Judge Graber argued that a university’s control of 
its curriculum may in fact be even broader than a primary or secondary 
school’s regulation of its curriculum, for “arguably the need for academic 
discipline and editorial rigor increases as a student’s learning progresses.”197 
3. Application of Hazelwood to Brown 
Finally, Judge Graber applied the Hazelwood standard to the facts in 
Brown and concluded, without any analysis, that Brown’s thesis, co-signed by 
members of the thesis committee, was not a public forum.198  Moreover, the 
“Acknowledgments” section was curricular “because it was designed to teach 
Plaintiff how to research within an academic specialty and how to present his 
 
 193. Id. at 949. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 950-51 (citing Bd. of Educ. Of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 
(2002) (“distinguishing between core educational functions and voluntary extracurricular 
activities for Fourth Amendment purposes”); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 
666, 673-74 (1998) (“‘Much like a university selecting a commencement speaker, a public 
institution selecting speakers for a lecture series, or a public school prescribing its curriculum, a 
broadcaster by its nature will facilitate the expression of some viewpoints instead of others.’”) 
(emphasis added); Bd. of Educ. Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 
862 (1982) (plurality refused to extend holding to curricular speech, noting “‘the only books at 
issue in this case are  library books, books that by their nature are optional rather than required 
reading.  Our adjudication of the present case thus does not intrude into the classroom, or into the 
compulsory courses taught there.’”)). 
 196. Brown, 308 F.3d at 951. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 954.  In fact, it seems that Judge Graber was not even sure that the thesis was the 
proper thing to use for the forum analysis.  Id. at 954 n.5 (noting that “[t]he dissent posits that a 
‘public forum’ analysis might provide an appropriate standard for this case.  However, the dissent 
does not identify what, precisely, could constitute a public forum in this case.”) (citations 
omitted). 
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results to other scholars in his field.”199  Judge Graber also rejected Brown’s 
reading of the Guide,200 concluding that Hazelwood did not require viewpoint 
neutrality, and thus “a teacher may require a student to write a paper from a 
particular viewpoint, even if it is a viewpoint with which the student disagrees, 
so long as the requirement serves a legitimate pedagogical purpose.”201  
According to Judge Graber, in Brown, the University’s legitimate pedagogical 
purpose was teaching Brown “the proper format for a scientific paper.”202  
With little discussion, Judge Graber also recognized that the committee 
members had a competing First Amendment right not to approve the thesis.203  
Finally, she concluded that even though other acknowledgement sections were 
“nonconforming,”204 no genuine issue of material fact existed because one 
thesis committee’s derelict adherence to the written academic standards 
“simply ha[d] no bearing on whether his thesis committee had a legitimate 
pedagogical purpose.”205  Even though this would admittedly result in a lack of 
uniformity, Judge Graber suggested that each committee could set its own 
academic standards without implicating First Amendment concerns.206 
C. Dissent’s Disagreement: Majority Disacknowledged First Amendment 
Implications207 
Judge Stephen Reinhardt began his analysis by putting the First 
Amendment issue in perspective, anticipating the reaction some might have to 
the case.  “Although the underlying dispute may appear to some to be trivial, 
 
 199. Id. at 952. 
 200. See supra text accompanying notes 157-160 for a discussion of Brown’s argument. 
 201. Brown, 308 F.3d at 953. 
 202. Id. at 952.  Judge Graber argued that the university was trying to teach Brown how to 
conform to professional norms.  Id. at 953. 
 203. Id. at 952 (citing Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 828-30 (6th Cir. 1989) (Parate held 
“that a university professor has a First Amendment right to assign grades and evaluate students as 
determined by his or her independent professional judgment.”))  Judge Graber thought the 
academic freedom interest was even more compelling in Brown than in Parate since the 
committee member’s names would be included in the thesis, suggesting that they were 
responsible for the entire content of the thesis—acknowledgement and all.  Brown, 308 F.3d at 
952. 
 204. Id. at 953.  For examples of other nonconforming “Acknowledgments” section, see 
supra note 158. 
 205. Id. at 953. 
 206. Id. at 953-54 (noting that “this thesis committee was entitled to set an academic standard 
for Plaintiff’s thesis, including its acknowledgments section, even if no thesis committee in the 
past had ever set one.”). 
 207. Note that Judge Reinhardt, in addition to dissenting, concurred in part.  Id. at 956 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting).  Judge Reinhardt agreed with Judge Graber and Judge Ferguson that 
the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment on Brown’s procedural due process claim 
should be affirmed and that the case should be sent back to the district court to address the 
California state law claims.  Brown, 308 F.3d at 956. 
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and perhaps not worthy of serious First Amendment deliberation, the extreme 
positions taken by the parties during the course of their disagreement and the 
erroneous legal rule advocated by [Judge Graber] leaves me with little choice 
but to discuss the constitutional questions in some depth.”208  Judge Reinhardt 
criticized the plurality for refusing to confront or discuss the First Amendment 
issues implicated in the case.209  Next, Judge Reinhardt presented his 
arguments: (1) Hazelwood was the erroneous legal standard; (2) a different 
legal standard or standards should be applied in the university setting; and (3) 
even assuming Hazelwood applied in the post-secondary setting, the facts on 
record presented genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary 
judgment.210 
1. Hazelwood is Inapplicable in the Post-secondary Setting 
Judge Reinhardt “vehemently disagree[ed]” with Judge Graber that 
Hazelwood should apply in the post-secondary setting.211  In reaching his 
conclusion, Judge Reinhardt considered underlying policy rationales and 
examined past precedent. 
First, Judge Reinhardt argued that differences between primary/secondary 
and post-secondary students warranted the inapplicability of Hazelwood.212  
High school students, Judge Reinhardt argued, are less emotionally mature 
than college and graduate students.213  Moreover, Judge Reinhardt argued, 
without giving examples, that the application of Hazelwood to universities and 
graduate schools would “seriously undermine the rights” of such students.214  
In addition, post-secondary students are typically more independent, and most 
enjoy greater legal freedoms than high school students, including, but not 
limited to, being able to purchase cigarettes, to marry, to the join the military, 
to vote, and to legally consume alcohol.215  In fact, Hazelwood itself suggested 
that such a distinction might be upheld.216 
Second, Judge Reinhardt argued that legal precedent showed that post-
secondary students should be afforded more First Amendment protections.  He 
pointed out that many of the cases that Judge Graber relied on in her analysis 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 959. 
 210. Id. at 957-58. 
 211. Id. at 960 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting). 
 212. Brown, 308 F.3d at 957. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 957. 
 215. Id. at 961.  Of course, some high school students may also have such rights, as Judge 
Reinhardt readily acknowledges.  Id.  However, a majority of students do not have such rights 
until reaching college. 
 216. Brown, 308 F.3d at 956 (Reihnardt, J. dissenting) (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988)). 
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included language that suggested Hazelwood was limited to primary and 
secondary student speech.217  Judge Reinhardt also cited cases that explicitly 
recognized that college and graduate students are less impressionable than 
primary and secondary students,218 cases that suggested primary and secondary 
students were subject to more discipline,219 and cases that stood for the 
proposition that post-secondary students should receive the same protection as 
adults outside of the educational setting.220 
Most importantly, Judge Reinhardt criticized Judge Graber for incorrectly 
importing the curricular-extracurricular distinction into the realm of 
Hazelwood.221  Judge Graber’s distinction, stated Judge Reinhardt, was 
“disingenuous at best.”222  In fact, Judge Reinhardt argued, the language of 
Hazelwood suggested that the deferential standard could be applied to both 
curricular and extracurricular activities.223  Accordingly, because the Kincaid 
case dealt with a student publication under faculty and university management, 
 
 217. Id. at 961 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southern Nev., Inc., v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 
941 F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (“discussing the immaturity of a high school 
audience and stating that the First Amendment standard applicable to high school student speech 
must provide educators with ‘the ability to consider the emotional maturity of the intended 
audience’”); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) (“‘[A] school must be 
able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience’”) (alteration in 
original); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683-84 (1986) (“emphasizing that 
one reason why high school officials should be accorded more deference to limit student speech is 
because a high school audience is ‘less mature’”)). 
 218. Id. at 961 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
835 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 
688 (1971)). 
 219. Id. at 961-62 (“The activities of high school students . . . may be more stringently 
reviewed than the conduct of college students, as the former are in a much more adolescent and 
immature stage of life.”) (citing Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ. Torrance Unified Sch. Dist., 682 F.2d 
858, 863 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982); Id. at 962 (noting that “‘A college relies in large measure on faculty 
self-governance and its contributions to administrative decisions.  This is analogous to, but 
different from a high school’s need to discipline by . . . superiors.’”) (quoting Mabey v. Reagan, 
537 F.2d 1036, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 1976)). 
 220. Brown, 308 F.3d at 962 (“emphasizing that ‘the right of teaching institutions to limit 
expressive freedom of students ha[s] been confined to high schools’”) (citing Bd. of Regents of 
the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239 n.4 (2000) (alterations in original); 
(“‘[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged 
need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses 
than in the community at large.’”) (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)). 
 221. Id. at 962-63 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
 222. Id. at 963. 
 223. Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)) (“‘[S]chool-
sponsored publications [and] theatrical productions’” that are ‘supervised by faculty members . . . 
are examples of expressive activities that ‘bear the imprimatur of the school’ and are therefore 
subject to the same degree of First Amendment scrutiny as curricular speech, even if they do not 
‘occur in a traditional classroom setting.’”)). 
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the language of Hazelwood arguably should have dictated a different result, 
contrary to Judge Graber’s analysis.224 
Ultimately, Judge Reinhardt concluded, “the reasons underlying the 
deference with respect to the regulation of the speech rights of high school 
youths do not apply in the adult world of college and graduate students, an 
arena in which academic freedom and vigorous debate are supposed to 
flourish . . . .”225 
2. Proposed Applicable Legal Standards226 
Although Judge Reinhardt did not provide an in-depth explanation of how 
current standards would be applied in student free speech cases, he proposed 
two alternative legal standards that could be applied in the post-secondary 
setting—standards that he thought would provide more protection for college 
and graduate students than Hazelwood, but that also would accommodate the 
university’s interest in furthering pedagogical purposes.227 
First, Judge Reinhardt argued that student speech in the post-secondary 
setting could be governed by the limited public forum doctrine.228  Under this 
doctrine, schools could impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions 
on speech, but could not make restrictions on the basis of viewpoint, and could 
only discriminate on the basis of content if school officials could show that the 
restriction at issue was narrowly drawn to accommodate some compelling 
interest.229  Second, Judge Reinhardt suggested that courts could apply an 
intermediate level of scrutiny to school regulations of college and graduate 
student speech, like the standard applied to the quasi-suspect gender class in 
equal protection claims.230 
 
 224. Id. 
 225. Brown, 308 F.3d at 957. 
 226. The viability and intelligibility of these proposed standards will be considered infra at 
Part IV.B. 
 227. Brown, 308 F.3d at 963-64 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).  Although he only mentioned two 
possible standards, Judge Reinhardt did not think that they were the only possibilities.  Id.  
Whatever standard ultimately applies, Judge Reinhardt cautioned that “it is important to 
distinguish student speech from university speech, teacher or other employee speech, and the 
speech of private individuals using the university’s facilities . . . .  [For] [i]t may be that different 
First Amendment standards are applicable in different contexts to restrictions imposed at the 
university level . . . .”  Id. at 964. 
 228. Id. at 964. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Brown, 308 F.3d at 964.  If such a standard were applicable to the university setting, “the 
university would have the burden of demonstrating that its regulation of college and graduate 
speech was substantially related to an important pedagogical purpose.” Id.  (emphasis added). 
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3. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Existed that Precluded Summary 
Judgment 
Even assuming Hazelwood applied, Judge Reinhardt still thought that the 
Brown case was improperly disposed of on summary judgment.231  Judge 
Reinhardt classified Brown as a case of excessive punishment.232  He argued 
that the actions taken by the university—withholding Brown’s degree for 
almost a year, and placing him on academic probation, making him ineligible 
for a university teaching or research position or financial aid—were grossly 
disproportionate in comparison to the alleged violation.233 
In Judge Reinhardt’s eyes, if Hazelwood applied, the ultimate resolution of 
the case would turn on the motivation of the defendant.234  And, as Judge 
Reinhardt argued, the facts of the case suggested the possibility of two 
competing possible motivations—the university may have punished Brown for 
his noncompliance with the “proper format for a scientific paper,” or the 
university may have punished him for his “hostile” and “castigating” views 
regarding university officials.235  As such, Judge Reinhardt concluded that 
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the university’s 
purported reasons for disciplining Brown were reasonably related to a 
legitimate pedagogical purpose or were pretextual, an issue that could not 
properly be decided by the court on a summary judgment motion.236  Thus, he 
would have, at the least, reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment on the First Amendment claims.237 
 
 231. Id. at 965. 
 232. Id. at 960 n.4 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).  Judge Reinhardt, piercing the veil of the 
defendants’ argument, noted, “this case is about much more than the mere decision not to approve 
the disacknowledgments or the ensuing decision not to permit the placement of the thesis in the 
library.”  Id. at 960. 
 233. Brown, 308 F.3d at 965. 
 234. Id. at 960. 
 235. Id. at 966, 967. 
 236. Id. at 967.  Judge Reinhardt argued that the possibility of pretext was strengthened by the 
fact that the University decided to confer the degree immediately after the media contacted the 
University and Brown.  Id. at 966.  In addition, the pretext argument was strengthened by the fact 
that the University had not disciplined a student who wrote the following acknowledgement: 
To: 1) the dips**ts who decided to put the P-chemists on the forth [sic] floor, 2) the inept 
facilities management monkey who raised the cooling water pressure and 3) the dumb ass 
who left his cooling water ON for a laser that was OFF for 2 years and subsequently 
flooded my lab, desk, and my most important files: may your bloated, limb-less bodies 
wash to shore and be picked clean by seabirds and maggots . . . . 
Brown, 308 F.3d at 967. 
 237. Id. at 957 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
A. Majority Misses the Point 
Judge Graber’s analysis failed to adequately safeguard the free speech 
rights of post-secondary students. Instead of squarely confronting the 
unresolved First Amendment issues in-depth, many of her arguments were 
conclusory and lacked support.  Most troubling, her opinion was plagued by a 
lack of underlying policy considerations—considerations indispensable to 
answering the threshold legal question of whether Hazelwood should apply in 
the university setting.  Specifically, Judge Graber’s analysis was erroneous for 
the following reasons: (1) Hazelwood should not apply in the post-secondary 
setting; (2) even if Hazelwood was the correct legal standard to apply, Judge 
Graber’s application of the deferential Hazelwood standard to the facts of 
Brown was incomplete; and (3) at the least, Brown raised genuine issues of 
material fact that precluded summary judgment. 
1. Hazelwood is Inapplicable in the Post-Secondary Setting238 
Lacking precedent, Judge Graber concluded that Hazelwood was the 
applicable legal standard in some situations when confronting post-secondary 
student free speech claims: 
We do not know with certainty that the Supreme Court would hold that 
Hazelwood controls the inquiry into whether a university’s requirements for 
and evaluation of a student’s curricular speech infringe that student’s First 
Amendment rights.  Nevertheless, of all the Supreme Court’s cases, 
Hazelwood appears to be the most analogous to the present case.239 
By so noting, Judge Graber amplified the weakness of her arguments.  In fact, 
this weakness was also underscored by the arbitrariness of the distinction she 
drew to distinguish Brown from other circuits that addressed the applicability 
of Hazelwood and because her analysis was not supported by policy reasons. 
a. Curricular versus Extracurricular: An Arbitrary Distinction 
The major premise underlying Judge Graber’s argument—the argument 
that allows her to apply Hazelwood to the university setting—was that 
Hazelwood applies in the post-secondary setting to curricular activities, but not 
to extracurricular activities.240  By drawing this distinction, Judge Graber 
attempted to distinguish Kincaid and Student Government Association, thus 
 
 238. This begs the question of what standard should apply in the post-secondary setting if 
Hazelwood does not.  Possible legal standards will be proffered and critiqued.  See infra Part 
IV.B. 
 239. Brown, 308 F.3d at 951. 
 240. See supra Part III.B.2 (examining in more detail the distinction that Judge Graber 
draws). 
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reaching the opposite conclusion of other circuits.241  However, this distinction, 
at least in the Hazelwood arena of law, is unsupported by the caselaw. 
First, the distinction is unsupported by the Hazelwood decision itself.  As 
Judge Reinhardt aptly pointed out in his dissent, the Hazelwood court, albeit in 
dicta, suggested that there was no per se bar to the applicability of the 
deferential Hazelwood standard to extracurricular activities: 
“School-sponsored publications [and] theatrical productions” . . . that are 
“supervised by faculty members” . . . are examples of expressive activities that 
“bear the imprimatur of the school” and are therefore subject to the same 
degree of First Amendment scrutiny as curricular speech, even if they do not 
“occur in a traditional classroom setting.”242 
The examples listed by the Hazelwood Court can be fairly characterized as 
extracurricular—an implication reinforced by the Court’s explanation that such 
activities do not occur in the traditional classroom setting.  In addition, 
although the particular facts of the case involved an activity that the Court 
characterized as “part of the educational curriculum and a ‘regular classroom 
activit[y],’”243 the Court’s holding referred only to “school-sponsored” 
activities, with no further limitation.244  Even if this is a misreading of the 
Hazelwood decision and this was not the intent of the Hazelwood Court, lower 
courts, in interpreting the Hazelwood decision, have held that this is a fair, if 
not correct, reading of Hazelwood.  For example, in 2002, the Tenth Circuit, in 
interpreting the applicability of Hazelwood to a tile-painting project at 
Columbine High School in Colorado, held the following: 
[T]he district court read Hazelwood as only applying “to activities conducted 
as part of the school curriculum.”  . . . We believe this reading of Hazelwood is 
too narrow.  We read the Court’s definition of “school-sponsored” speech to 
mean activities that might reasonably be perceived to bear the imprimatur of 
the school and that involve pedagogical concerns.245 
 
 241. For a more in-depth discussion of these decisions, see supra text accompanying notes 
122-28. 
 242. Brown, 308 F.3d at 963 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
 243. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268. 
 244. Id. at 273. 
 245. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 924 (10th Cir. 2002).  The court 
concluded that the project was school-sponsored speech, even though “the painting activity took 
place outside of school hours and was not mandatory,” and even despite a school official who had 
explicitly stated, “‘this is a project outside of the school, this is a separate project . . . .’”  Id. at 
930.  For a more in-depth discussion of Fleming, see supra notes 109-111 and accompanying 
text.  Judge Reinhardt, in his dissent, provided an example of school-sponsored speech that takes 
place outside of school hours and is not mandatory from the Ninth Circuit.  Brown, 308 F.3d at 
963 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting) (“interpreting the Supreme Court’s Hazelwood decision and 
holding that ‘the Court intended that the same principles that animate educational decisions . . . 
come into play when determining what advertisements are suitable for publication in school 
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Thus, although the Supreme Court has noted a curricular-extracurricular 
distinction in non-Hazelwood cases,246 the Supreme Court arguably did not 
uphold this distinction in Hazelwood. 
Contrary to Judge Graber’s conclusion, more prevalent in the rhetoric of 
lower court cases applying Hazelwood are distinctions based not on the 
supposed curricular-extracurricular dichotomy, but instead on the differences 
between primary and secondary students as opposed to college and graduate 
students.  In fact, this is a distinction that courts and individual judges 
recognized even before Hazelwood emerged onto the jurisprudential scene.247  
Courts applying Hazelwood in the pre-collegiate setting and courts applying 
Hazelwood in the post-secondary setting have recognized such a distinction.248  
In addition, the pre-collegiate/post-secondary distinction finds support in other 
First Amendment cases outside of the Hazelwood context.249 
Most importantly, the Hazelwood decision explicitly noted that such a 
distinction might be recognized in student free speech jurisprudence.250  
Although the ultimate viability of such a distinction has not been definitively 
 
newspapers, yearbooks and athletic programs.’”) (citing Planned Parenthood of Southern Nev., 
Inc. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, (9th Cir. 1991) (omissions in original). 
 246. See supra note 195. 
 247. See, e.g., J.D. Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1986) (Hill, J., dissenting).  In 
that decision, Judge Hill criticized the majority for applying the Fraser standard at the college 
level and noted: 
The purpose of education through high school is to instill basic knowledge, to lay the 
foundations to enable a student to learn greater knowledge, and to teach basic social, 
moral, and political values.  A college education, on the other hand, deals more with 
challenging a student’s ideas and concepts on a given subject matter.  The college 
atmosphere enables students to rethink their views on various issues in an intellectual 
atmosphere which forces students to analyze their basic beliefs.  Thus, high school is 
necessarily more structured than college, where a more free-wheeling experience is both 
contemplated and needed.  What might be instructionally unacceptable in high school 
might be fully acceptable in college. 
Id. at 588.  The case of Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D.C. Mass. 1971), also discusses 
this distinction at some length: 
The secondary school more clearly that the college or university acts in loco parentis with 
respect to minors.  It is closely governed by a school board selected by a local 
community . . . .  While secondary schools are not rigid disciplinary institutions, neither 
are they open forums in which mature adults, already habituated to social restraints, 
exchange ideas on a level of parity. 
Id. at 1392. 
 248. See supra Part II.D. 
 249. See supra Part II.E. 
 250. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988) (“We need not now 
decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored 
expressive activities at the college and university level.”). 
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determined,251 the Supreme Court, in recent student free speech jurisprudence, 
seems inclined to uphold the distinction.252  In fact, even before Hazelwood 
came onto the jurisprudential scene, the Supreme Court endorsed such a 
distinction in decisions such as Healy and Papish.253These Supreme Court and 
lower court precedents combine to strongly suggest that, contrary to Judge 
Graber’s conclusion, Hazelwood should not apply in the post-secondary 
setting. 
b. Deep-Seated Distinctions: Applying Hazelwood is Not Good Policy 
Although Judge Reinhardt only briefly discussed the underlying policies 
that caution against applying Hazelwood to undergraduate and graduate student 
speech,254 similar policy discussions are noticeably absent from Judge Graber’s 
analysis.  Judge Graber could have, and should have, considered the competing 
policy arguments.  If she had, she might have come to the proper conclusion 
that applying Hazelwood would not make for good policy. 
First, one need not look further than the underlying differences between 
pre-collegiate and post-secondary students, both in and outside of the 
classroom, to see that applying Hazelwood to undergraduate and graduate 
students would be detrimental.  For example, there is ample psychological data 
to support the conclusion that students at the different levels fundamentally 
differ.255  Because school officials have to be more concerned with the 
impressionability of primary and secondary students, a concern that the 
Supreme Court apparently recognized when formulating the deferential 
Hazelwood standard, it would be both unfair and illogical to apply the same 
standard to college and graduate students. 
Moreover, the dynamics of the educational setting in the pre-collegiate and 
post-secondary settings differ greatly.  The pre-collegiate educational setting 
 
 251. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It is thus an open question whether 
Hazelwood articulates the standard for reviewing a university’s assessment of a student’s 
academic work.”). 
 252. See supra Part II.D.2.a. 
 253. See supra Part II.C.  The Healy Court set out the following standard: “While a college 
has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus . . . a ‘heavy burden’ rests on the 
college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action.”  Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 
(1972).  In Papish, the Court concluded that only reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions 
could be imposed on post-secondary student speech, reasoning “that the mere dissemination of 
ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state university cammpus [sic] may not be 
shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’”  Papish v. Bd. Of Curators of the Univ. 
of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (per curiam). 
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 211-215. 
 255. See supra note 115. 
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has been characterized as one of “cultural transmission.”256  According to this 
theory: 
The school environment provides “inputs” of information that the 
student/machine stores and then “outputs” as behavior.  Because the child’s 
internal thought processes merely reflect physical and social inputs, cultural 
transmissionists see the educational process as a guided acquisition of 
knowledge that reinforces desirable responses and eliminates undesirable 
ones . . . .  [T]he purpose of education is . . . to assure the internalization of 
established norms, with the child’s need to learn societal discipline receiving 
particular emphasis.257 
In contrast to the cultural transmission theory is “progressivism.”258  Unlike 
cultural transmission, progressivism “highly values student expression and 
independent thought,” and the primary goal of progressive education is to 
develop the student’s thought processes.259  Until the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Hazelwood, cultural transmission was rejected and progressivism was 
advocated in higher education.260  In contrast, before Hazelwood, the pre-
collegiate educational setting was characterized by cultural transmission or 
indoctrination.261  With the advent of the deferential Hazelwood standard, 
cultural transmission was arguably even more deeply imbedded in free speech 
jurisprudence.262  Extending the application of Hazelwood to the free speech 
rights of undergraduate and graduate students conflicts with the progressivist 
environment that was so entrenched in the post-secondary educational setting. 
Second, aside from the more theoretical considerations, there are practical 
considerations to address.  The introduction of the deferential Hazelwood 
standard to student free speech jurisprudence has had a noticeably detrimental 
effect at the high school level.  For example, within three weeks of the 
Hazelwood decision, the Student Press Law Center (“SPLC”) – a non-profit 
organization that seeks to protect student media rights – “answered more than 
 
 256. William B. Senhauser, Note, Education and the Court: The Supreme Court’s Ideology, 
40 VAND. L. REV. 939, 943 (1987). 
 257. Id. at 943-44 (citing Lawrence Kohlberg & Rochelle Mayer, Development as the Aim of 
Education, 42 HARV. EDUC. REV. 449, 456 (1972)). 
 258. Id. at 947. 
 259. Id. at 948. 
 260. Id. at 952-53. 
 261. Senhauser, supra note 256, at 952, 962-977.  Senhauser does note that for a while, it 
seemed as though the Supreme Court was going to, and did indeed, embrace progressivism at the 
primary and secondary level with its Tinker decision.  Id. at 954-59.  However, the cultural 
transmission ideology was “revitalized” by the Supreme Court’s decision in Fraser.  Id. at 971. 
 262. Senhauser’s article does not address the effect of the Hazelwood decision, for it was 
published before Hazelwood was decided.  However, because Hazelwood arguably established an 
even more deferential standard than Fraser, it would not at all be a stretch to say that Hazelwood 
not only embraced, but also extended the cultural transmission ideology.  For a discussion of 
Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood, see supra Part II.A. 
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500 calls from students, teachers, and professional journalists about the 
implications of the opinion.”263  Even ten years after Hazelwood, the SPLC 
was receiving calls on average of “one per day, every day.”264  The Director of 
the SPLC, attributing this to Hazelwood, stated, “Hazelwood has essentially 
gutted the First Amendment in many of America1s [sic] high schools . . . .”265  
Moreover, the Hazelwood analysis has been extended “beyond the realm of 
student expression rights” into other areas implicating pre-collegiate students’ 
concerns.266  Most strikingly, cases that actually rule censorship improper 
under the deferential Hazelwood standard are “rare.”267  Based on such 
ramifications from the application of Hazelwood at the pre-collegiate level, the 
ramifications for college and graduate students would be just as devastating, if 
not more.  According to its terms, the Hazelwood standard tips the balance in 
favor of school officials, giving them much authority and discretion to censor 
student speech.  In a setting where students are more mature, have more legal 
rights, and where the emphasis is on independent thinking instead of 
indoctrination, such censorship could ultimately lead to the demise of the 
“marketplace of ideas.”268 
 
 263. Rosemary C. Salamone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of 
Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253, 271 (1992).  The SPLC continued to track an increase in 
censorship after the Hazelwood decision, reporting that “school officials show[ed] little hesitation 
to censor student publications for a variety of arguably ‘pedagogical’ reasons.”  Id. at 307.  In 
addition, “[a]lmost without exception, courts uph[o]ld school officials’ decisions to censor.”  
Richard J. Peltz, Censorship Tsunami Spares College Media: To Protect Free Expression on 
Public Campuses, Lessons from the “College Hazelwood” Case, 68 TENN. L. REV. 481, 497 
(2001).  Moreover, Peltz lists examples of “cases of censorship that never reach[ed] the 
courtroom.”  Id. at 497-98. 
 264. Peltz, supra note 263, at 498. 
 265. Student Press Law Center, High School Censorship Calls Soar in ‘97, 14 REPORT 3 (Fall 
1998) (quoting SPLC Executive Director Mark Goodman) (quotation marks omitted), available 
at http://www.splc.org/report_detail.asp?id=272&edition=10 (last visited February 28, 2003).  
For example, “[t]he Hazelwood doctrine in the high schools [has given] principals nearly 
unbridled discretion to say what is and what is not appropriate content for student media.”  Peltz, 
supra note 263, at 533. 
 266. Peltz, supra note 263, at 499. 
 267. See, e.g., id. at 505-06 (describing one case as “ground-breaking for its pro-student 
conclusion under a purely Hazelwood analysis.”).  Importantly, Hazelwood emphasized that “the 
education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and 
local school officials, and not of federal judges.”  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 
260, 273 (1988).  One commentator points out that “[i]n most of the cases citing this facet of 
Hazelwood, the [C]ourt held in favor of the administration, using [this] exact quote.”  Mel Krutz, 
Hazelwood: Results and Realities, in PRESERVING INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM: FIGHTING 
CENSORSHIP IN OUR SCHOOLS 223 (Jean E. Brown ed., 1994). 
 268. Keyishan v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).  Peltz forecasted the “chilling 
effect” that Hazelwood would have in the context of the college media: 
A chilling effect at the college level would of course be disastrous for cutting off vital 
forums for information and debate on college campus.  But the consequences could be 
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2. Even if Hazelwood Applies, Judge Graber’s Application was 
Erroneous 
Even assuming, despite the past precedent and policy reasons discussed 
above, that Hazelwood was the correct legal standard for the Ninth Circuit to 
apply in Brown v. Li, Judge Graber’s application did not comport with the 
standards and guidelines set forth in Hazelwood.  An analysis of the facts from 
Brown under the framework set forth in Hazelwood reveals that the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied. 
a. Brown’s “Disacknowledgments” Did Not Bear the “Imprimatur” of 
the School 
The Hazelwood Court specifically defined the Hazelwood category of 
speech as “expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the 
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”269  The 
Court noted that school officials are entitled to a great amount of control over 
such speech in order “to assure that the views of the individual speaker are not 
erroneously attributed to the school.”270  Just how much control can school 
officials exercise?  According to Hazelwood, school officials can set 
“standards that may be higher than those demanded by some . . . publishers . . . 
in the ‘real’ world . . . .”271  Contrary to the high school students in Hazelwood, 
Brown was operating in the “real” world, far removed from eight-hour school 
days, bells ringing, and recess.  He had completed high school.  He had 
completed his undergraduate studies.  He was a graduate master’s student, on 
the road to publishing his thesis, “The Morphology of Calcium Carbonate,” a 
thesis designed to add to the body of knowledge in the professional scientific 
community.272  For these and other reasons that will be discussed, it is quite 
doubtful that a reasonable third party would come to the conclusion that 
Brown’s “Disacknowledgements” section would be attributed to the members 
of his thesis committee.273 
 
even more tragic outside the ivy-covered walls.  Imagine a generation of college-trained 
journalists with no practical experience handling controversial subject matter, nor with 
any more than an academic understanding of the role of the Fourth Estate in American 
society . . . .  [T]he quality of professional journalism would suffer immeasurably. 
Peltz, supra note 263, at 534-35. 
 269. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
 270. Id. at 271. 
 271. Id. at 272 (emphasis added). 
 272. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 943 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 273. Some might argue that even if this is true, the library still has the ultimate discretion to 
determine whether to display such student works on its shelves or in its file cabinets.  Although 
there is no case on point, in Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, the Court 
confronted the issue of whether school officials could remove materials from the library “because 
particular passages . . . offended their social, political and moral tastes . . . .”  457 U.S. 853, 858-
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Judge Graber assumed, but did not analyze whether or why, the 
“Disacknowledgments” section would be attributed to the school.  She 
bypassed any analysis of this issue by viewing the content of Brown’s research 
as one with the “Disacknowledgments” section.274  Instead, she should have 
disassociated the optional “Disacknowledgments” section from the content of 
Brown’s work, as a reasonable person reading Brown’s thesis likely would 
have done.  In the context of the Brown case, the reasonable person for 
purposes of analysis is a reasonable (and probably educated) adult reader, as is 
suggested by the complexity of his thesis title and the purpose for which the 
thesis was being published, namely, to add to existing scientific research.  An 
argument that such an adult would conclude that the University adopted and 
approved of Brown’s “Disacknowledgments” is unsupported.  Books, law 
review articles, and theses are some examples of works that contain 
“Acknowledgments” sections.  As is most readily illustrated with bound 
works, this section normally appears on a page or pages at the beginning of the 
work, often even before the pages containing the table of contents.  These 
sections normally appear separate from the substance of the work and are 
noticeably personal, sometimes naming people of whom and events of which 
the reader has no knowledge.  Based on both their content and physical 
disassociation from the content of the work, the likelihood that such a section 
would “bear the imprimatur of the school” is virtually nonexistent. 
Moreover, Judge Graber ignored the fact that the school had allowed 
another student (“Student A”) to include what was, based on its language, 
 
59 (1982).  The Court, after analyzing its precedents, stated: “[School officials] possess 
significant discretion to determine the content of their school libraries.  But that discretion may 
not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political manner. . . .  Our Constitution does not permit 
the official suppression of ideas.”  Id. at 870-71.  The Court also stated: “[J]ust as access to ideas 
makes it possible for citizens generally to exercise their rights of free speech and press in a 
meaningful manner, such access prepares students for active and effective participation in [our] 
pluralistic, often contentious society . . . .”  Id. at 868.  However, the Court expressly limited its 
holding: “[N]othing in our decision today affects in any way the discretion of a local school board 
to choose books to add to the libraries of their schools.”  Id. at 871.  Thus, some may read this 
opinion as allowing school officials much discretion in choosing what books to exclude from its 
shelves.  However, the Court also made another distinction: 
[This case] does not involve textbooks . . . .  Respondents do not seek in this Court to 
impose limitations upon their school Board’s discretion to prescribe the curricula of 
the . . . schools.  On the contrary, the only books at issue in this case are library books, 
books that by their nature are optional rather than required reading. 
Id. at 861-62. 
Brown’s thesis is more analogous to optional reading than a textbook, for no one would be 
compelled to read his thesis.  Thus, to the extent that Pico can be read as allowing possible 
unfettered discretion to school officials in determining what to add to their library shelves, it is 
inapplicable to Brown’s situation. 
 274. Brown, 308 F.3d at 952. 
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more of a “Disacknowledgments” than an “Acknowledgments” section.275  
Although Student A did not name any particular school officials, the student’s 
“Acknowledgment” section could arguably be characterized by some as more 
offensively descriptive than Brown’s.  In addition to using profanity, Student A 
“acknowledged” some members of the school’s staff by writing “may your 
bloated, limb-less bodies wash to shore and be picked clean by seabirds and 
maggots.”276  Brown’s “Disacknowledgments” section, in contrast, used no 
profanity,277 and the arguably harshest word Brown used to refer to school 
officials was “degenerates.”278  Student A’s “Acknowledgments” section, 
however, was approved.  How the school could argue that Brown’s views, but 
not Student A’s, could be attributed to the school remains a mystery.  Judge 
Graber did not even attempt to account for this inconsistency.  Thus, because it 
was unlikely that Brown’s “Disacknolwedgments” section would be perceived 
by outsiders to bear the imprimatur of the school, the deferential Hazelwood 
standard should not have applied. 
b. The Optional “Acknowledgments” Section Was a Limited Public 
Forum 
Once more, Judge Graber’s analysis suffered from a lack of explanation.  
Without any explanation, she concluded: “An academic thesis co-signed by a 
committee of professors is not a public forum, limited or otherwise.”279  Judge 
Graber’s conclusion is erroneous, however, for she misidentified the proper 
forum for analysis. 
The Supreme Court has not confined the definition of a forum to physical 
locations; instead, a forum can be “metaphysical” and/or an “intangible 
channel[] of communication.”280  Thus, for instance, courts have declared that 
incorporating a public comment period into a school board agenda and 
including an advertising section within a magazine created limited public 
forums.281 
 
 275. See id. at 967 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
 276. Id. at 967. 
 277. Note, however, that his amended “Disacknowledgments” section did not contain 
profanity.  Id. at 943. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Brown, 308 F.3d at 954. 
 280. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995); 
Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 476 (1st Cir. 1989). 
 281. Rutgers 1000 Alumni Council v. Rutgers, 803 A.2d 679, 687 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2002) (advertising section); Bach v. Sch. Bd. of the City of Va. Beach, 139 F. Supp. 2d 738, 741 
(E.D. Va. 2001) (public comment period).  In Bach, the challenged governmental action took the 
form of school board bylaws that “prohibit[ed] personal attacks.”  Id. at 739.  The plaintiffs 
contended that while those who criticized school officials would be silenced, another “speaker 
would be able to proffer laudatory praises of the school officials without fear of being 
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As argued above, the “Acknowledgments” or “Disacknowledgments” 
section can be disassociated from the actual substantive and academic portion 
of the thesis.282  Because Brown’s expressive activity was regulated only in the 
“Disacknowledgments” section,283 that section is the proper basis for the forum 
analysis. 
Although not a traditional public forum, the “Acknowledgments” section 
should have been characterized as a limited public forum, not a nonpublic 
forum, as Judge Graber concluded.284  To reach this determination, one must 
first analyze the policies and practices of the school and take into account any 
clear indication that the school officials did not intend to create a limited public 
forum.285  School officials at the University of California at Santa Barbara did 
not produce “clear evidence” of a contrary intent.  Instead, an examination of 
their policies and practices indicates quite the opposite. 
First, the university officials, through the school’s thesis Guide, manifested 
an intent to create a limited public forum.  The language of the policy is 
permissive, indicating that the inclusion of an “Acknowledgements” in a 
student thesis was optional.286  Although the policy provided for a restriction 
on format, the language of the policy did not place any explicit restrictions on 
the content of the section.  Of course, one may argue that by titling that portion 
of the Guide “Dedication and/or Acknowledgments,” the school evidenced 
such an intent.  However, this by no means establishes the “clear” intent that is 
seemingly necessary under the mandates of Cornelius.287  Thus, in the words 
of Hazelwood, school officials opened the “Acknowledgment” forum “‘for 
indiscriminate use’ . . . by some segment of the public,” namely, all thesis 
students.288 
Even more compelling were the university officials’ own actions.  If their 
intent was to limit the content of the “Acknowledgments” section to the sorts 
of examples cited in Turabian’s Style Manual, or some variation thereof, the 
school failed miserably and obviously did not enforce it with any consistency.  
As has already been noted, the record was peppered with examples of 
approved student “Acknowledgments” sections that arguably do not fall within 
 
silenced . . . .”  Id. at 742.  Ultimately, the court agreed and concluded that such “[a] policy that 
chills protected speech cannot stand.”  Id. at 744. 
 282. See supra Part IV.A.2.a. 
 283. Brown, 308 F.3d at 943 (noting that the actual substantive portion of Brown’s thesis was 
originally approved by the thesis committee). 
 284. For a discussion of the differences between these types of forum, see supra Part II.B. 
 285. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80. 
 286. See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text. 
 287. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).  This is 
especially true when considered in light of the university’s actual practice. 
 288. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n 
v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47, 46 n.3 (1983)). 
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the ambit of their own proffered definition—most notably, the student who, in 
so many words, “Acknowledged” the ineptitude of school employees.289 The 
school officials’ actions were characterized not by consistency, but by selective 
enforcement. 
Selective enforcement, however, is exactly what the First Amendment 
seeks to avoid. Judge Graber would uphold selective enforcement.290  She 
would allow for a lack of uniformity of the enforcement of student free speech 
rights based on the level of laxness of a particular overseeing thesis committee.  
However, once a limited public forum is established, school officials can 
exclude students from the forum based on content, but cannot exclude students 
based on their individual viewpoints.291  A simple example illustrates this 
point: 
When the government builds a theater, for example, it creates a limited public 
forum open to theatrical productions.  Other forms of expression, such as 
petitioning, would not be welcome in a theater, and they could therefore be 
excluded on a reasonable basis. The government cannot exclude a particular 
theatrical production from the theater, however, without a compelling 
justification.292 
Contrary to Judge Graber’s conclusion, Brown was excluded because of his 
unpopular viewpoints.  The school officials cannot argue that their actions 
were content-based and not viewpoint-based.  If the school officials’ actions or 
intentions were content-related, they would have also excluded Student A’s 
“Acknowledgments” section, and disciplined him as well.293  The Supreme 
Court has made it very clear: “The government must abstain from regulating 
speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of 
the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”294 
 
 289. See supra note 159. 
 290. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 953 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “this thesis committee was 
entitled to set an academic standard for Plaintiff’s thesis, including it acknowledgments section, 
even if no thesis committee in the past ever had set one.”). 
 291. See supra text accompanying note 78. 
 292. Rudy, supra note 67, at 1261 (footnotes omitted). 
 293. A similar argument and analysis was advanced in Bach v. Sch. Bd. of the City of Va. 
Beach, 139 F. Supp. 2d 738 (E.D. Va. 2001).  In Bach, plaintiffs claimed that the school’s 
regulations “prohibiting ‘personal attacks’ during the public comment period of School Board 
meetings” constituted an unconstitutional infringement on their First Amendment right to free 
speech.  Id. at 739.  However, although factually distinguishable from Brown, the court’s analysis 
and reasoning is instructive.  Per the contested provision in Bach, a speaker could not criticize the 
school administration.  Id. at 742.  However, similar to the effect of the provision in Brown, “[a]t 
the same time, a speaker would be able to proffer laudatory praises of the school officials without 
fear of being silenced, because the contested provision places no corresponding ban on statements 
that promote or inflate the honesty, integrity, or character of a named official.”  Id. 
 294. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
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The policies and practices of the school officials manifested an intent to 
create a limited public forum.  Once that public forum was created, the school 
officials were bound to its terms.  By punishing Brown because of his 
“Disacknowledgments” section, the officials overstepped those bounds, and in 
doing so, violated the letter and the spirit of the First Amendment. 
c. Even if the “Acknowledgments” Section was a Non-public Forum, the 
University’s Actions Constituted Impermissible Viewpoint 
Discrimination 
Assuming, arguendo, that Judge Graber was correct in concluding that the 
thesis as a whole constituted a nonpublic forum, the university’s actions still 
amounted to an infringement of Brown’s First Amendment free speech rights. 
According to traditional public forum analysis, viewpoint discrimination is 
impermissible even in the context of a nonpublic forum.295  However, a circuit 
split has developed over whether the notion of viewpoint neutrality is required 
when analyzing nonpublic forums under the rubric of Hazelwood.296  The First 
and the Third Circuits are among those circuits that have concluded viewpoint 
discrimination is allowed in Hazelwood-type cases; the Sixth and Eleventh 
Circuits are among those who mandate viewpoint neutrality.297  The Ninth 
 
 295. Janna J. Annest, Note and Comment, Only the News That’s Fit to Print: The Effect of 
Hazelwood on the First Amendment Viewpoint-Neutrality Requirement in Public School-
Sponsored Forums, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1227, 1227 (2002). 
 296. Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000).  For an 
analysis of the interplay of Hazelwood and the viewpoint neutrality requirement, see Annest, 
supra note 295. 
 297. Downs, 228 F.3d. at 1011 n.2.  The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained: 
[The Perry Court held that the school] may regulate speech on that property only if the 
regulation is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression due to the view 
expressed . . . .  [W]hile citing Perry Educ. Ass’n, the Court in Kuhlmeier did not require 
that school regulation of school-sponsored speech be viewpoint neutral. 
Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (1st Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).  The Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit agreed, stating: 
Hazelwood clearly stands for the proposition that educators may impose non-viewpoint 
neutral restrictions on the content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive 
activities so long as those restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns . . . . Under Hazelwood, “[e]ducators are entitled to exercise greater control 
over . . . student expression” when it is elicited as part of a teacher-supervised, school-
sponsored activity.  In that specific environment, viewpoint neutrality is neither necessary 
nor appropriate, as the school is there [sic] responsible for “determin[ing] the content of 
the education it provides.” 
C.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 172-73 (3rd Cir. 1999) (alterations in original) (quoting Hazelwood 
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) and Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833, vacated en 
banc, 226 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2000)).  See also Annest, supra note 290, at 1246 n.194 (“The Third 
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court regarding the events . . . which had given rise 
to the panel’s discussion of Hazelwood.  The panel analysis of Hazelwood thus remains as 
persuasive authority on the circuit’s position.”) (citations omitted).  On the other hand, the Sixth 
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Circuit has authority that might be read to support both positions.  For 
example, in Chandler v. McMinnville, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit did not even mention viewpoint neutrality in explaining that 
Hazelwood held that “federal courts are to defer to a school’s decision to 
suppress or punish vulgar, lewd, or plainly offensive speech, and to 
‘disassociate itself’ from speech that a reasonable person would view as 
bearing the imprimatur of the school . . . .”298  In Planned Parenthood v. Clark 
County School District, however, the court of appeals “incorporated ‘viewpoint 
neutrality’ analysis into nonpublic forum, school-sponsored speech cases.”299  
However, although it dealt with school-sponsorship, this was not a Hazelwood 
case, and thus, is not necessarily controlling.300 
In Brown, Judge Graber took the position that viewpoint neutrality was not 
required.  However, the circuit split should be resolved in favor of requiring 
viewpoint neutrality.  First, allowing viewpoint discrimination makes the 
already deferential Hazelwood standard even more deferential.  Student rights 
would be left to the whims of school officials.  Moreover, viewpoint neutrality 
has been incorporated into the forum analysis for quite some time, and a 
departure from this would not comport with the concept of stare decisis.  In 
fact, the absence of any discussion of viewpoint neutrality and discrimination 
in Hazelwood has even been called a “curious omission.”301  It is quite 
possible, however, that the Court did not discuss the issue because it felt that it 
was settled and did not warrant any further discussion.  Maybe the omission 
was not so curious after all.  As the Eleventh Circuit best articulated the 
reason: “[T]here is no indication that the [Hazelwood] Court intended to 
 
and Eleventh Circuits disagree.  See, e.g., Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719, 727 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(vacated en banc, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The Court in Hazelwood noted . . . that if the 
school did not intentionally create a public forum, then the publication remains a nonpublic 
forum, and school officials may impose any reasonable, non-viewpoint-based restriction on 
student speech exhibited therein.”)); Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1325 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(“Although Hazelwood provides reasons for allowing a school official to discriminate based on 
content, we do not believe it offers any justification for allowing educators to discriminate based 
on viewpoint.  The prohibition against viewpoint discrimination is firmly embedded in first 
amendment analysis . . . .  Without more explicit direction, we will continue to require school 
officials to make decisions relating to speech which are viewpoint neutral.”) (citations omitted). 
 298. Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992).  However, this 
language was dicta.  See Downs, 228 F.3d at 1011. 
 299. Id. at 1010-11 (discussing Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. 
Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 828 n.19, 829-30 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 300. Planned Parenthood involved school educators’ refusals to accept advertisements for 
Planned Parenthood in student yearbooks, newspapers, and athletic programs.  Id. at 1010.  
Although noting the split, the court did not reach the issue in Downs, for the court concluded 
neither Hazelwood nor Planned Parenthood was applicable “because it is a case of the 
government itself speaking.”  Id. at 1011. 
 301. Peltz, supra note 263, at 506. 
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drastically rewrite First Amendment law to allow a school official to 
discriminate based on a speaker’s views.”302 
Assuming that this was the correct standard, the University’s actions in 
Brown would violate the First Amendment, for the same reasons stated 
above.303 
d. University’s Actions Needed to be Reasonably Related to Legitimate 
Pedagogical Goals 
Even assuming Judge Graber correctly decided that the 
“Acknowledgments” section did not constitute a limited public forum and that 
Hazelwood does not require viewpoint neutrality, the University’s actions in 
regulating Brown’s speech should have failed under the terms of the 
Hazelwood standard.  The Hazelwood decision itself suggests that to be 
illegitimate, the University’s actions would have to serve “no valid educational 
purpose.”304  Although this guidance from Hazelwood suggests that school 
officials’ decisions about what is legitimate or not will rarely be disturbed, the 
facts of Brown suggest that this might be one of those rare cases. 
Judge Graber concluded that the University’s legitimate pedagogical 
objective was “teaching [Brown] the proper format for a scientific paper.”305  
However, the content of Brown’s “Disacknowledgments” section arguably has 
nothing to do with the proper format of a scientific paper.  Moreover, the fact 
that an “Acknowledgments” section is disassociated from the content of the 
thesis student’s scientific research and scientific conclusions only further 
bolsters this argument.306  It seems illogical to argue, as Judge Graber does, 
that if masters’ students have not learned the “skill” of writing an optional 
acknowledgments section, “they are not qualified to receive advanced degrees 
in chemistry.”307  Moreover, one could argue that no legitimate pedagogical 
reason exists because the educational purpose sought to be furthered by a 
master’s thesis is independent thought and analysis, not conformity.308 
 
 302. Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1319 n.7. 
 303. See supra text accompanying notes 290-94. 
 304. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
 305. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 306. See supra Part IV.A.2.a. 
 307. Brown, 308 F.3d at 959-60 n.3 (Reinhardt, J., and dissenting). 
 308. Peltz made a similar argument in the context of the applicability of Hazelwood to college 
media/publications: 
A “no legitimate pedagogical concerns” argument might succeed at the college level for 
the very reason that Hazelwood was an unwise decision to begin with: practical 
experience with editorial freedom and responsibility is an essential component of an 
education in journalism.  Of course, the same argument pertains at the high-school level 
and failed to stop Hazelwood.  But the argument might be stronger at the college level.  
Employers in journalism specifically look for experienced candidates, and the collegiate 
journalism academy emphasizes the importance of on-the-job training. 
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Even assuming Judge Graber was correct in deciding that the University 
articulated a legitimate pedagogical goal, in order for the University’s actions 
to be upheld, the actions had to be reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
goals.309  Judge Graber concluded that Brown’s “thesis was subject to a 
reviewing committee’s reasonable regulation” and that Brown “was given 
reasonable standards for that assignment.”310  However, Judge Graber did not 
explain how she came to this conclusion.  As the dissent points out, the 
University’s extreme actions could hardly be “reasonably related” to any 
legitimate pedagogical goal.  Not only did the University officials decide not to 
confer Brown’s degree, but they also put him on academic probation, which 
prevented him from researching, teaching, or getting financial aid.311  What 
goal the University attempted to accomplish by imposing such an unreasonable 
sanction is unclear.  The reasonable relation between the University’s actions 
and the goal of teaching Brown how to write a scientific paper in the proper 
format is tenuous, if not nonexistent. 
Thus, in performing the Hazelwood analysis, Judge Graber, at the least, 
should have recognized that there were questions of fact pertaining to the 
reason for the University’s harsh sanctions.  At the least, this suggests that 
summary judgment should not have been granted. 
B. Proposed Standards 
Judge Reinhardt’s dissent best accommodated the need to vigorously 
safeguard free speech rights in the university setting.  First, he correctly 
pointed out that Judge Graber’s extracurricular-curricular distinction was not 
supported by Hazelwood-type caselaw.  Moreover, he did what Judge Graber 
failed to do—he gave recognition to the potentially pretextual bases for the 
school officials’ actions.  Most importantly, he attempted to delineate proposed 
standards that would accommodate the competing interests, instead of just 
trying to cram Brown into a framework in which, because of the deep-seeded 
distinctions between the pre-collegiate and collegiate level, it plainly did not 
fit.  In short, instead of just ignoring the problems created by the application of 
Hazelwood at the post-secondary level, Judge Reinhardt tried to create 
solutions. 
Assuming Hazelwood is the erroneous legal standard to apply in post-
secondary free speech cases leaves the following question unanswered: What 
 
Peltz, supra note 263, at 549.  Of course, one can argue that Judge Graber did not need to provide 
much explanation for why the University’s actions were reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical goals because the Hazelwood standard, by its terms, provides much deference to 
school officials.  However, this argument only underscores the policy reasons case law warranting 
the inapplicability of Hazelwood in the post-secondary setting.  See supra Part IV.A.1.b. 
 309. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. 
 310. Brown, 308 F.3d at 952 (emphasis added). 
 311. Id. at 965 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
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should take its place?  Following are some proposed standards, including those 
proffered by Judge Graber, accompanied by critiques.312 
1. Modified Hazelwood 
It may be that the Supreme Court, if it ever decides to close the gap in 
post-secondary free speech jurisprudence created by Hazelwood’s seventh 
footnote, would be hesitant in straying from the Hazelwood framework.  The 
Court might still want to perpetuate the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood distinction 
in the post-secondary setting, but with some sensitivity to the pre-collegiate 
and post-secondary distinctions.313  As it now stands, Hazelwood weighs 
heavily in favor of high school officials.  One proposed solution would be to 
implement some sort of modified Hazelwood standard when analyzing post-
secondary free speech claims.  The Eleventh Circuit attempted to do just that in 
Bishop v. Aronov, giving teacher autonomy more weight than probably would 
have been considered in a high school Hazelwood case.314  Analogously, when 
 
 312. The following proposed standards advocate judicial activism more than judicial restraint.  
Some commentators suggest that judicial restraint is the proper solution.  See, e.g., Michael 
Rebell, Tinker, Hazelwood and the Remedial Role of the Courts in Education Litigation, 69 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 539 (1995). 
The reconciliation of the values of autonomy and authority has to come at the community 
level . . . . [A] judge ought to establish a remedial process that brings a broad 
representative group of people from the affected community together, and set up a special 
master, a facilitator or some representative of the court, as a liaison between the 
community and the court to ensure that there is a proper dialogue. 
Id. at 549.  Although this solution may be proper at the pre-collegiate level, it would not be a 
workable solution at the post-secondary level.  Community involvement at colleges and 
universities is likely not as prevalent as it is at the primary and secondary levels.  Moreover, there 
is a greater judicial interest in oversight at the post-secondary level because school officials are 
not acting in loco parentis with respect to undergraduate and graduate students. 
 313. Tinker, of course, would apply in situations where the expressive activity is deemed to 
be “political,” Fraser, where the activity is deemed to be “sexual or offensive,” and Hazelwood, 
where the activity is deemed to bear the imprimatur of the school.  See supra Part II.A. 
 314. The Eleventh Circuit attempted to do just this in Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 
(11th Cir. 1991) (“[I]nsofar as [the Hazelwood standard] covers the extent to which an institution 
may limit in-school expressions which suggest the school’s approval, we adopt the Court’s 
reasoning as suitable to our ends, even at the university level.”).  Although Bishop involved 
academic freedom, it is still instructive.  In applying a purportedly modified Hazelwood standard, 
the Bishop court said it would take into account the “context” (the dynamics of the university 
classroom, including “the coercive effect upon students [by] a professor’s speech”), “the 
University’s position as a public employer which may reasonably restrict the speech rights of 
employees more readily than the those [sic] of other persons,” and “the strong predilection for 
academic freedom as an adjunct of the free speech rights of the First Amendment.”  Id. at 1074-
75.  However, even though this standard was “modified,” it still led to much deference toward 
school officials’ decisions in its application.  Id. at 1075 (noting “in any event, we cannot 
supplant our discretion for that of the University”).  Thus, although the court seemingly tried to 
be progressive, it ended up being too traditional.  The court itself even noted that it could have 
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considering the totality of the circumstances in applying the Hazelwood test at 
the post-secondary level, the Court could decide instead to tip the balance more 
in favor of the student.  For example, the unique environment of the post-
secondary educational setting, including the fact that undergraduate and 
graduate students are more mature, and the amorphous notion of the 
“marketplace of ideas,” should weigh more heavily in the Hazelwood analysis.  
The California Court of Appeals, in DiBona v. Matthews, similarly interpreted 
Hazelwood to apply in a modified fashion in the post-secondary setting.315  
Ultimately, the court concluded, without much further explanation or guidance, 
that “school sponsorship is a factor which under some circumstances can be 
considered at the college level,” and that “[a]lthough the ‘legitimate 
pedagogical concerns’ at the college and university level may be more limited 
than in elementary and secondary schools, they are not nonexistent.”316 
However, because the school officials would still retain a considerable 
amount of discretion and deference, a modified standard would likely not give 
full recognition to the policy reasons against extending Hazelwood to the post-
secondary setting.317 
2. Totally Tinker 
A second proposed solution to fill the Hazelwood hole would be to apply 
the Tinker standard to all student free speech claims at the post-secondary 
level.  Accordingly, school officials would only be able to prohibit expressive 
activity if they could proffer “evidence that it is necessary to avoid material 
and substantial interference with the schoolwork or discipline . . . .”318  This 
standard is more protective of students’ free speech rights than Hazelwood, and 
seems to recognize and compensate for the underlying differences between 
 
provided more deference to teachers but did not.  Id. at 1072 n.5 (citing Gregory A. Clarick, Note, 
Public School Teachers and the First Amendment: Protecting the Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 693 (1990)) (“The [Clarick] article suggests a balancing approach somewhat like the one we 
will endeavor to apply.  The article, however, weighs teacher autonomy more heavily than we 
have concluded is proper under Kuhlmeier.”).  For a discussion of the facts of Bishop, see supra 
note 139. 
 315. DiBona v. Matthews, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329 (Ct. App. 1990).  The DiBona court gave 
more weight to the student’s First Amendment rights than the Bishop court gave to the teacher’s 
First Amendment rights when comparing them to a school official’s rights.  Citing Healy and 
Papish as authoritative law, the DiBona court expressed doubt whether a showing of “school 
sponsorship” would warrant the rationale of Hazelwood’s “wholesale extension to educational 
settings involving adults.”  Id. at 1346-47. 
 316. Id. at 1347. 
 317. For a discussion of these policy arguments, see supra Part IV.A.1.b. 
 318. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (emphasis 
added).  According to this test, “school officials cannot suppress ‘expressions of feelings with 
which they do not wish to contend.’”  Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 
1966)). 
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primary/secondary and undergraduate/graduate students.  For example, some 
argue that Tinker embraces the ideology of “progressivism”—an ideology that 
is characteristic of the higher educational environment.319  However, such a 
total application of the Tinker standard to all types of free speech claims is not 
supported by the caselaw, for Tinker has been limited to “political messages” 
that do not bear the imprimatur of the school.320  Thus, it is highly unlikely that 
the Court would extend Tinker in such a manner. 
3. Limited Public Forum 
The first proposed alternative Judge Reinhardt suggested is to apply the 
limited public forum analysis to all regulations of student speech at the post-
secondary level.321  However, the Supreme Court would unlikely be prepared 
to make a blanket declaration that all speech in the university setting fits into 
the rubric of the public forum analysis.  As no requirement of viewpoint 
neutrality could “drastically rewrite First Amendment law,” so, too, could this. 
4. Intermediate Level of Scrutiny 
The second alternative that Judge Reinhardt suggested as more protective 
of post-secondary students’ rights was “an intermediate level of scrutiny for 
regulations of student speech in college and graduate programs.”322  
Comparing Brown to United States v. Virginia, a Supreme Court case applying 
intermediate scrutiny in the equal protection context, Judge Reinhardt stated 
that under this standard, “the university would have the burden of 
demonstrating that its regulation of college and graduate student speech was 
substantially related to an important pedagogical purpose.”323  Judge Reinhardt 
 
 319. Senhauser, supra note 256, at 954-56 (arguing that the Tinker court “implicitly” applied 
progressivism and “discounted both the inculcative interest of the state and the alleged 
immaturity of students at the secondary educational level . . . .”). 
 320. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 923 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 321. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 964 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
 322. Id.  Intermediate scrutiny is to be contrasted with strict scrutiny, which requires that the 
law in question both serve a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to meet 
that goal.  Alternatively, minimum rationality “requires that the law in question have a rational 
relationship to a legitimate public purpose or government interest.”  Heather J. Lorenz, Comment, 
The Key to Unlocking the Schoolhouse Doors: Intermediate Scrutiny, the Appropriate Standard 
of Review for Race-Conscious Desegregation Policies, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 169, 178-79 (2000) 
(citing Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-2, 16-6, at 1439-40, 1451-52 
(2d ed. 1988)). 
 323. Brown, 308 F.3d at 964 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515, 533 (1996)).  In the equal protection context, the court has applied this standard to “laws 
involving affirmative action, laws that discriminate on the basis of gender, and occasionally, laws 
that discriminate against aliens, nonmarital children, and individuals with mental disabilities.”  
Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 316-17 (1998) (footnotes omitted). 
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implied that this standard would strike a more equal balance than a limited 
public forum analysis.324  He stated that although it provided more deference to 
school officials than the limited public forum, an intermediate level of scrutiny 
provided more protection for students’ free speech rights than Hazelwood.325 
In actuality, the intermediate scrutiny standard applied in the First 
Amendment context would be slightly different than the standard Judge 
Reinhardt articulated, depending on the type of regulation at issue.326  If the 
Supreme Court was of the opinion that students’ First Amendment rights are 
equally as important as school officials’ interests in regulating such speech, it 
would likely adopt this standard.  Although an intermediate level of scrutiny 
strikes the fairest balance between school official and student rights,327 it is a 
standard that is highly likely to yield inconsistent results.328  In addition, an 
adoption of this standard by the Court is seemingly inconsistent with its pre-
Hazelwood pronouncements regarding student free speech rights in the 
university setting.329 
5. Back to the Basics: Healy and Papish 
Finally, the Supreme Court could return to two of its precedents that are 
still cited today, which would allow school officials a limited amount of 
 
 324. Brown, 308 F.3d at 964. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Wexler, supra note 323, at 318 n.129.  In First Amendment jurisprudence, intermediate 
scrutiny has applied to content-neutral regulations, time, place, and manner regulations, and 
regulations of commercial speech.  Id. at 317.  If the regulation related to commercial speech, the 
regulation must “‘directly advance[] the governmental interest asserted,’” and be no “‘more 
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.’”  Id. at 318 n.129 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).  If the regulation being 
challenged is content-neutral, the regulation must further the interest and be “‘no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest.’” Id. (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 
377 (1968)).  Finally, if the regulation is one of time, place, or manner, the Court “additionally 
requires that the speaker have adequate alternative channels for his or her expression.”  Id. (citing 
Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981)). 
 327. Wexler, supra note 323, at 318 (“The most striking feature of intermediate scrutiny is 
that, unlike strict scrutiny or rationality review, the tier of scrutiny that the Court decides to apply 
does not predetermine the outcome of the case; with intermediate scrutiny, sometimes the state 
wins, and sometimes it loses.”). 
 328. Of course this is true, at least to some extent, with all standards/tests that courts apply.  
However, the intermediate level of scrutiny seems particularly susceptible to this “problem.”  Id. 
at 322.  Wexler noted, 
Intermediate scrutiny facilitates and encourages narrow decisionmaking by requiring the 
Court to focus its attention on the facts of particular cases.  This practice means that each 
new case will generally not be predetermined by previous cases and that the decision in 
any given case will not resolve many issues in future cases. 
Id. 
 329. In these pre-Hazelwood cases, the Court suggested that free speech rights should apply 
with full force in the post-secondary setting.  See infra Part II.C. 
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authority to regulate expressive activity while safeguarding the First 
Amendment rights of post-secondary students.  Thus, it would accommodate 
both competing interests, albeit with the balance most definitely tipped in favor 
of students instead of school officials. 
Both Healy and Papish recognized that post-secondary students should be 
afforded the same First Amendment protection as adults.  For example, in 
Healy, the Court specifically stressed in its opinion that First Amendment free 
speech rights should apply with equal force on post-secondary campuses as 
they apply to members of society at large.330  To accomplish this, the Court 
emphasized that there is a heavy burden on school officials to justify their 
actions when they impose restraints on student free speech at the post-
secondary level.331  Likewise, in Papish, the Court emphatically stated that 
“the First Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard in 
the academic community with respect to the content of speech . . . .”332 
Although Healy and Papish provide some general standards for the lower 
courts to follow, the Court could instead craft more explanatory and expansive 
guidelines from the rhetoric of these cases and use them as a starting point for 
developing a well-entrenched, post-secondary free speech jurisprudence.  
Ultimately, this would be the ideal solution for the unanswered footnote seven 
in Hazelwood.  Whereas the deferential Hazelwood standard recognizes the 
unique primary and secondary school setting, a new standard emanating from 
Healy and Papish would be more student-friendly, recognizing the uniqueness 
of the post-secondary setting. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
“[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is 
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”333  In Brown, 
preservation of the status quo prevailed.  However, in all cases involving 
student speech, especially at the post-secondary level, this pronouncement is 
particularly instructive.  In every case, competing interests must be balanced 
and assessed, and for the courts, this surely is no simple feat.  As the statement 
makes clear, however, the First Amendment exists to protect those who might 
otherwise remain unprotected, especially when those individuals espouse 
unpopular beliefs.  That protection should no less be afforded to post-
secondary students. 
 
 330. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). 
 331. Id. at 184. 
 332. Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 671 (1973). 
 333. Edward T. Ramey, Student Expression: The Legacy of Tinker in the Wake of Columbine, 
77 DENV. U. L. REV. 699, 701 (2000) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)). 
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Of course, the rights of professors cannot be ignored.334  The amorphous 
concept of “academic freedom” is, some would argue, an equally entrenched 
right.335  How should the professors’ rights be balanced into the equation?  At 
present, academic freedom jurisprudence is also in a state of disarray, for the 
Supreme Court has failed to clearly delineate the parameters of professors’ 
rights.336  Some courts even apply the deferential Hazelwood standard to 
academic freedom cases,337 leading at least one commentator to conclude that 
“[t]he net effect of [this application] is the subtle infantilization of teachers.”338  
The same effect results when courts apply the Hazelwood standard to 
determine the scope of undergraduate and graduate students’ rights.  To avoid 
these ill-fated consequences, both professors and students must be viewed in 
light of what they are—adults.  Ultimately, there is no easy solution when the 
rights of professors and students clash.  Under any of the proposed standards, 
one thing remains clear: Students’ rights should weigh heavily in determining 
the outcome of any given case. 
The time has come for the Supreme Court to speak so that undergraduate 
and graduate students may speak without fear of adverse consequences.  As 
one court declared: “‘It is a prized American privilege to speak one’s mind, 
although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions’” and 
“[t]his includes the ability to question the fitness of the community leaders, 
including the administrative leaders in a school system.”339  However, for 
 
 334. For example, one can imagine a situation where a student sues a professor, alleging a 
violation of First Amendment free speech rights because of a poor grade that the student received 
on, for example, a paper advocating the student’s views. 
 335. For a more in-depth discussion of academic freedom jurisprudence, see Karen C. Daly, 
Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2001). 
 336. Id. at 5-6. 
 337. Id. at 16 n.84 (citing Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 
(8th Cir. 1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723 (2nd 
Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 
F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1991); Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 112, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 
(7th Cir. 1990)). 
 338. Id. at 16. 
 339. Bach v. Sch. Bd. of Va. Beach, 139 F. Supp. 2d 738, 743 (E.D. Va. 2001) (quoting New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).  At issue in Bach was a school regulation 
that prohibited, inter alia, “attacks or accusations regarding the honesty, character, integrity or 
other like personal attributes of any identified individual or group” during the public comment 
period at school board meetings.  Id. at 740 n.1.  In addition, the regulation mandated that 
individuals “[r]efrain from words or statements which, from their usual construction and common 
acceptance, are construed as insults and tend to violence or breach of the peace.”  Id.  (emphasis 
added).  The court noted that the school had created a limited public forum.  Id. at 741.  The court 
held that the regulation prohibiting personal attacks was unconstitutional, “for a policy that deters 
individuals from speaking out on an issue of public importance violates the First Amendment.”  
Id. at 743 (citing Sec. of St. of Md. v. Joseph Hunson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 967-68 (1984)).  
Analogous to the situation in Bach, Brown criticized school officials, at least implicitly, for the 
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almost fifteen years, the Court has left lower courts, school officials, and, most 
importantly, undergraduate and graduate students wondering about the scope 
of their rights.  This has, as one might expect, led to both inconsistent and 
unfair results.  Whatever standard the Supreme Court chooses to apply, it must 
recognize that post-secondary students are adults who deserve to be treated like 
adults, both in and outside of the classroom. 
Some may still view Brown as an insignificant case—a case of a bitter 
student, dissatisfied with his educational experience, who vented his 
frustrations in the wrong place at the wrong time.  Brown, however, is anything 
but an insignificant case.  If criticisms from those like Brown are not protected, 
more socially acceptable or politically correct criticisms will also be in 
danger.340  Still, many will argue that Brown should have written a letter to the 
editor instead of including a “Disacknowledgments” section with his thesis.  In 
the view of many, an adoption of Judge Reinhardt’s analysis, if taken to its 
logical extreme, would lead this country down the proverbial “slippery slope.”  
Whenever a student is dissatisfied with a grade, he or she could attempt to hide 
behind the cloak of the First Amendment and could repeatedly sue professors 
for unsatisfactory grades, claiming that the professor did not agree with the 
views expressed therein.  To some, allowing the Browns of the world to prevail 
would merely be a manifestation of freedom run amok.  However, “[t]here 
is . . . a philosophical and practical commitment to [such] ‘hazardous 
freedom . . . that is the basis of our national strength.’  If we want that strength 
to last, this commitment belongs as much in our schools as it does anywhere in 
our society.”341 
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manner in which they conducted school affairs.  As in Bach, this is arguably just as much of an 
issue of public importance. 
 340. Justice Black made this point in his dissenting opinion in Communist Party of the United 
States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).  (“I do 
not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and 
assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or 
later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.”). 
 341. Ramey, supra note 333, at 711 (omission in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Tinker 
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969)). 
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